In contrast, a military disengagement by the end of 2006, derived from a more realistic definition of an adequate outcome, could ensure that desisting is not tantamount to losing. In an Iraq dominated by the Shiites and the Kurds -- who together account for close to 75 percent of the population -- the two peoples would share a common interest in Iraq's independence as a state. The Kurds, with their autonomy already amounting in effect to quasi-sovereignty, would otherwise be threatened by the Turks. And the Iraqi Shiites are first of all Arabs; they have no desire to be Iran's satellites. Some Sunnis, once they were aware that the U.S. occupation was drawing to a close and that soon they would be facing an overwhelming Shiite-Kurdish coalition, would be more inclined to accommodate the new political realities, especially when deprived of the rallying cry of resistance to a foreign occupier.
In addition, it is likely that both Kuwait and the Kurdish regions of Iraq would be amenable to some residual U.S. military presence as a guarantee against a sudden upheaval. Once the United States terminated its military occupation, some form of participation by Muslim states in peacekeeping in Iraq would be easier to contrive, and their involvement could also help to cool anti-American passions in the region.
[...]The requisite first step to that end is for the president to break out of his political cocoon. His policy making and his speeches are the products of the true believers around him who are largely responsible for the mess in Iraq. They have a special stake in their definition of victory, and they reinforce his convictions instead of refining his judgments. The president badly needs to widen his circle of advisers. Why not consult some esteemed Republicans and Democrats not seeking public office -- say, Warren Rudman or Colin Powell or Lee Hamilton or George Mitchell -- regarding the definition of an attainable yet tolerable outcome in Iraq?
Finally, Democratic leaders should stop equivocating while carping. Those who want to lead in 2008 are particularly unwilling to state clearly that ending the war soon is both desirable and feasible. They fear being labeled as unpatriotic. Yet defining a practical alternative would provide a politically effective rebuttal to those who mindlessly seek an unattainable "victory." America needs a real choice regarding its tragic misadventure in Iraq.
It makes me nervous when anyone starts talking about a specific time table in Iraq. The end of 2006 seems very close for the kind of outcome Brzezinski expects. The withdrawal or garrisoning of American troops will immediately precipitate the battle for Kirkuk. Right now, the Kurds have the upper hand. The Turkmen have lots of people in town and there are quite a few Sunnis around as well. Turkey will not tolerate a Turkman massacre. They are already said to have a military unit in the area. Nothing short of a compromise by the Kurds would give enough to allow Sunnis to hold some oil fields. I don't see the Kurds letting go without a fight.
Djerejian has a compelling argument against Brzezinski's view.
THE BELGRAVIA DISPATCH
Iraq has been horrifically difficult (spare me Battle of La Somme number-crunching troll-ies. I'm speaking in terms of contemporary standards, for a war of choice, and let's us not forget the very significant Iraqi casualties either). Approximately 30 American servicemen have died there over the past two or three days. A Blackhawk went down today, five Marines died in Fallujah, and yesterday I.E.D.s and gunfire killed several soldiers in various locations throughout Iraq. We are angry at those who declared the war would be a "cakewalk", or that the war was in its "last throes," just as we are angry at the imbeciles in print media and the blogosphere who have declared victory from the safety of their Pj's and keyboards. We are angry at these empty spinmeisters, many of them clueless cretins whose knowledge of the Middle East wouldn't fill a small thimble. We are angry too at crass Congresswoman intimating people like Jack Murtha are cowards, when he loves the Army, even if his policy recommendations are unsound, more deeply than perhaps any other serving member of the House. We are angry at the rank ignorance and near dereliction of duty of our Secretary of Defense, and the incredible lack of accountability his continuing presence in that job showcases. And, yes, the President has been a source of not inconsiderable frustration as well, his tepid and half-hearted emergence from a bubble of too uniform advice, of late, notwithstanding. But Bush does know, and he is hearing it from people like Zalmay Khalilzad, that a precipitous withdrawal could well portend disaster. And, as much as Democrats refuse to acknowledge it, I am near certain a Kerry Administration (given Kerry's campaign utterances and world-view) would have organized a too hasty retreat from Iraq with little consideration to what impact such a move would have had on the country's chances for emerging as a unitary and viable, if imperfect, democracy.
So you may protest this is but flawed policy wrapped in an illusion, that Iraq is going to hell in a hand basket no matter whether we stay or go. But I hear from foreign policy pros that the cause is not lost, that with patience, and with a multi-faceted strategy that has become increasingly sophisticated since the State Department took over more of the Iraq portfolio after Rumsfeld's sad bungling of Years 1 and 2, matters are improving and the project is salvageable. This may sound like a thin reed, all told, but it's perhaps better than Zbig B's too breezy "acceptance of the complex post-Hussein Iraqi realities." If "complex" means that the country could descend into large scale ethnic cleansing, or that Kurdish and Shi'a detention centers will sprout up with impunity, or that a Shi'a super-state with massive Iranian influence would sprout up in the South--well, let's at least be clear about what we could be talking about.
Large scale ethnic cleansing would seem likely. American presence has kept it more hidden so far, but recent Badr statements and actions by their Ministry of Interior suggests that will not last long.
I don't like the idea of staying "as long as it takes." Right now, the American presence is restraining the political influence of the Sunnis, preventing them from asserting their coercive persuasion. Yes, that means more death and destruction. The Americans are likely the only reason Zarqawi has a free hand. I suspect as Americans disappear from Sunni areas and cities, Zarqawi will be slapped down hard by the Sunnis. The Iranians are welcome support to the Shi'a of Iraq, but even Sistani has rebuffed any more meaningful presence. Iranians hardly want a government of national unity for which Sistani has called.
All the signs are there that Brzezinski is right. But there is no way of knowing that it can happen by the end of 2006. I like a view between Brzezinski and Djerejian, very much like Juan Cole's view.
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