Tajikistan: Government Resorts to Repression and Intimidation

Tajikistan: Government Resorts to Repression and Intimidation

Authorities in Tajikistan are resorting to repression and intimidation as they try to contain what they view as the Kyrgyz contagion. Tajik leaders are clearly concerned that the political upheaval which engulfed Kyrgyzstan in March – when popular discontent over rigged parliamentary elections culminated in the overthrow of Askar Akayev’s administration – could spread to other countries in Central Asia. Tajikistan held parliamentary elections the same day as Kyrgyzstan’s legislative vote. As in Kyrgyzstan, the Tajik voting results were criticized by Western observers and opposition supporters as flawed in favor of the incumbent administration.

Following the Tajik election, opposition leaders threatened to stage protests unless their complaints were redressed. Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov, however, has remained defiant. In his April 16 state-of-the-nation address, Rahmonov summarily dismissed election fraud complaints. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Rather than admit any wrongdoing and seek to defuse tension through dialogue, Rahmonov has gone on the political offensive.


A central element to the Tajik government’s strategy appears to be an effort hamper the ability of foreign diplomats and international aid workers to interact with local non-governmental organization activists and independent journalists. On April 14, the Tajik Foreign Ministry announced that foreign diplomats and representatives of international organizations must provide prior notice of public contacts with Tajik citizens who are affiliated with political parties, NGOs and mass media outlets.

[...]
Despite the muted American response over the new rule, there is evident tension in the US-Tajik relationship, connected in part to the perception among many officials in Dushanbe that the US government was a behind-the-scenes player in the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Washington has adamantly denied direct involvement in the revolutions.

[..]
Meanwhile, Rahmonov’s administration is clamping down on its domestic political opponents. On April 27, Tajik Prosecutor-General Bobojon Bobokhonov announced that the leader of the Democratic Party, Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, was being held in Dushanbe on charges of engaging in subversive activity.


Iskandarov originally had been taken into custody in Moscow, and held by Russian authorities for months as they considered a Tajik government extradition request. In a surprise decision on April 3, Russian officials freed Iskandarov, citing a lack of evidence. Upon his release, the Democratic Party leader said the charges against him were politically motivated, and vowed to return to Tajikistan to promote democratic change in the country.


About a week after his release in Moscow, Iskandarov disappeared from public view. How he ended up in a Dushanbe detention center remains a mystery. Bobokhonov said that authorities arrested Iskandarov on April 22, but provided no details on where he was taken into custody. Some local observers believe that Iskandarov may have been effectively kidnapped in Moscow and returned to Dushanbe.

The Bush Administration and its Neo-con think tank continue to play a covert hand in Central Asia. This article is published on a website run by the Open Society Institute-New York (OSI-NY) whose director is George Soros. Although OSI-NY as a not-for-profit properly separates itself from Soros's progressive political activities, Soros has spent billions of dollars exporting his visition of free society to the world through OSI-NY. Soros talks about his views on another site of his:
GeorgeSoros.com

Paradoxically, the most successful open society in the world, the US, does not properly understand the first principles of an open society; indeed, its current leadership actively disavows them. The concept of open society is based on the recognition that nobody possesses the ultimate truth, and that to claim otherwise leads to repression. In short, we may be wrong.


That is precisely the possibility that Bush refuses to acknowledge, and his denial appeals to a significant segment of the American public. An equally significant segment is appalled. This has left the US not only deeply divided, but also at loggerheads with much of the rest of the world, which considers our policies high-handed and arbitrary.


President Bush regards his reelection as an endorsement of his policies, and feels reinforced in his distorted view of the world. The "accountability moment" has passed, he claims, and he is ready to confront tyranny throughout the world according to his own lights.


But we cannot forego the critical process that is at the core of an open society – as we did for eighteen months after September 11, 2001. That is what has led us into the Iraq quagmire.


A better understanding of the concept of open society would require us to distinguish between promoting freedom and democracy and promoting American values and interests. If it is freedom and democracy that we want, we can foster it only by strengthening international law and international institutions.


Bush is right to assert that repressive regimes can no longer hide behind a cloak of sovereignty: what goes on inside tyrannies and failed states is of vital interest to the rest of the world. But intervention in other states' internal affairs must be legitimate, which requires clearly established rules.

Tajikistan | George Soros on the Bush Doctrine
Eurasia Insight:
TAJIKISTAN: GOVERNMENT RESORTS TO REPRESSION AND INTIMIDATION
Nazar Nazarov: 4/29/05
Authorities in Tajikistan are resorting to repression and intimidation as they try to contain what they view as the Kyrgyz contagion.
Tajik leaders are clearly concerned that the political upheaval which engulfed Kyrgyzstan in March – when popular discontent over rigged parliamentary elections culminated in the overthrow of Askar Akayev’s administration – could spread to other countries in Central Asia. Tajikistan held parliamentary elections the same day as Kyrgyzstan’s legislative vote. As in Kyrgyzstan, the Tajik voting results were criticized by Western observers and opposition supporters as flawed in favor of the incumbent administration. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
Following the Tajik election, opposition leaders threatened to stage protests unless their complaints were redressed. Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov, however, has remained defiant. In his April 16 state-of-the-nation address, Rahmonov summarily dismissed election fraud complaints. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Rather than admit any wrongdoing and seek to defuse tension through dialogue, Rahmonov has gone on the political offensive.
A central element to the Tajik government’s strategy appears to be an effort hamper the ability of foreign diplomats and international aid workers to interact with local non-governmental organization activists and independent journalists. On April 14, the Tajik Foreign Ministry announced that foreign diplomats and representatives of international organizations must provide prior notice of public contacts with Tajik citizens who are affiliated with political parties, NGOs and mass media outlets.
Observers in Dushanbe say the government’s action appears driven by the belief that outside actors played major roles not only in Kyrgyzstan’s revolution, but also in those in Georgia in 2003 and in Ukraine in 2004. Administration critics contend that Rahmonov wants to significantly reduce communications between Tajik democracy activists and foreign embassies and international organizations. (EurasiaNet operates under the auspices of the New York-based Open Society Institute, which also has an affiliated foundation operating in the Tajik capital Dushanbe).
“Due to recent events in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan’s government has decided to take the situation under control,” said Shokirjon Khakimov, deputy head of the Tajik Social-Democratic Party. “Such [actions] are intended to prevent repetition of [revolutionary] events in Tajikistan.” Rahmonov is especially keen to keep the lid on dissent these days, given that he will be running for re-election in 2006, Khakimov added.
A Foreign Ministry official insisted the new rule was intended to prevent “the spread of propaganda.” The official suggested that some opposition politicians, NGO representatives and independent journalists of distorting information gleaned from contacts with foreign embassies and other officially registered entities. The diplomatic response to the Foreign Ministry announcement has been generally restrained, with representatives of various embassies using rhetoric seemingly designed to reassure Tajik officials. US diplomats, for example, stressed that long before the announcement of the new rule, the lines of communication between the American Embassy and the Tajik government were open and strong. Despite the muted American response over the new rule, there is evident tension in the US-Tajik relationship, connected in part to the perception among many officials in Dushanbe that the US government was a behind-the-scenes player in the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Washington has adamantly denied direct involvement in the revolutions. Such denials did not prevent several government newspapers from publishing a document, subsequently proven to be fraudulent, purporting that the United States provided financial assistance to Akayev opponents prior to the March 24 revolution. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive].
The US Embassy on April 20 issued a sharply worded denial, saying American officials were “surprised and dismayed” that official Tajik mass media outlets would disseminate such a “crude fabrication.” The embassy statement called on the Tajik government to disassociate itself from the claims contained in the forged document. “Such irresponsible ‘journalism’ is not conducive to promoting regional stability and to building the strong bilateral US-Tajikistan relations that both President Bush and President Rahmonov have called for,” it said.
Meanwhile, Rahmonov’s administration is clamping down on its domestic political opponents. On April 27, Tajik Prosecutor-General Bobojon Bobokhonov announced that the leader of the Democratic Party, Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, was being held in Dushanbe on charges of engaging in subversive activity.
Iskandarov originally had been taken into custody in Moscow, and held by Russian authorities for months as they considered a Tajik government extradition request. In a surprise decision on April 3, Russian officials freed Iskandarov, citing a lack of evidence. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Upon his release, the Democratic Party leader said the charges against him were politically motivated, and vowed to return to Tajikistan to promote democratic change in the country.
About a week after his release in Moscow, Iskandarov disappeared from public view. How he ended up in a Dushanbe detention center remains a mystery. Bobokhonov said that authorities arrested Iskandarov on April 22, but provided no details on where he was taken into custody. Some local observers believe that Iskandarov may have been effectively kidnapped in Moscow and returned to Dushanbe.
Editor’s Note: Nazar Nazarov is a pseuodonym for a writer who specializes in Tajik affairs.
Posted April 29, 2005 © Eurasianet
http://www.eurasianet.org
The Central Eurasia Project aims, through its website, meetings, papers, and grants, to foster a more informed debate about the social, political and economic developments of the Caucasus and Central Asia. It is a program of the Open Society Institute-New York. The Open Society Institute-New York is a private operating and grantmaking foundation that promotes the development of open societies around the world by supporting educational, social, and legal reform, and by encouraging alternative approaches to complex and controversial issues. The views expressed in this publication do not necessarily represent the position of the Open Society Institute and are the sole responsibility of the author or authors.
The New Bush Doctrine
by George Soros
President George W. Bush's second inaugural address set forth an ambitious vision of the role of the United States in advancing the cause of freedom worldwide, fueling worldwide speculation over the course of American foreign policy during the next four years. The ideas expressed in Bush's speech thus deserve serious consideration.
"[I]t is the policy of the United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture," Bush declared, "with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world."
There is a bow to diplomacy in the assurance that fulfilling this mission "is not primarily the task of arms, though we will defend our friends and ourselves by force of arms when necessary." Similarly, Bush recognizes that outsiders cannot force liberty on people. Instead, "Freedom by its nature must be chosen and defended by citizens and sustained by the rule of law and the protection of minorities."
Finally, there is acceptance of diversity, for "when the soul of a nation finally speaks, the institutions that arise may reflect customs and traditions very different from our own. America will not impose our own style of government on the unwilling. Our goal instead is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom and make their own way."
I agree with this goal, and have devoted the last fifteen years of my life and several billion dollars of my fortune to attaining it. Yet I find myself in sharp disagreement with the Bush administration. It is not only that there is a large gap between official words and deeds; I find that the words sometimes directly contradict the deeds in a kind of Orwellian doublespeak.
When Bush declared war on terror, he used that war to invade Iraq. When no connection with Al Qaeda could be established and no weapons of mass destruction could be found, he declared that we invaded Iraq to introduce democracy. We are about to convert elections in Iraq into a civil war between a Shi'a-Kurd dominated government and a Sunni insurrection.
In Iraq and beyond, when Bush says that "freedom will prevail," many interpret him to mean that America will prevail. This has impugned our motives and deprived us of whatever moral authority we once had in intervening in other countries' domestic affairs. If, for example, we offer support to Iranian students who are genuinely striving for greater freedom, we are now more likely to endanger them and reinforce regime hardliners.
To explain what is wrong with the new Bush doctrine, I have to invoke the concept of open society. That is the concept that has guided me in my efforts to foster freedom around the world. The work has been carried out through foundations operating on the ground and led by citizens who understand the limits of the possible in their countries. Occasionally, when a repressive regime expels our foundation – as has happened in Belarus and Uzbekistan – we operate from the outside.
Paradoxically, the most successful open society in the world, the US, does not properly understand the first principles of an open society; indeed, its current leadership actively disavows them. The concept of open society is based on the recognition that nobody possesses the ultimate truth, and that to claim otherwise leads to repression. In short, we may be wrong.
That is precisely the possibility that Bush refuses to acknowledge, and his denial appeals to a significant segment of the American public. An equally significant segment is appalled. This has left the US not only deeply divided, but also at loggerheads with much of the rest of the world, which considers our policies high-handed and arbitrary.
President Bush regards his reelection as an endorsement of his policies, and feels reinforced in his distorted view of the world. The "accountability moment" has passed, he claims, and he is ready to confront tyranny throughout the world according to his own lights.
But we cannot forego the critical process that is at the core of an open society – as we did for eighteen months after September 11, 2001. That is what has led us into the Iraq quagmire.
A better understanding of the concept of open society would require us to distinguish between promoting freedom and democracy and promoting American values and interests. If it is freedom and democracy that we want, we can foster it only by strengthening international law and international institutions.
Bush is right to assert that repressive regimes can no longer hide behind a cloak of sovereignty: what goes on inside tyrannies and failed states is of vital interest to the rest of the world. But intervention in other states' internal affairs must be legitimate, which requires clearly established rules.
As the dominant power in the world, America has a unique responsibility to provide leadership in international cooperation. America cannot do whatever it wants, as the Iraqi debacle has demonstrated; but, at the same time, nothing much can be achieved in the way of international cooperation without US leadership, or at least active participation. Only by taking these lessons to heart can progress be made towards the lofty goals that Bush has announced.
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