International Crisis Group (ICG) - Conflict prevention and resolution
In Iraq, the U.S. is engaged in a war it already may have lost while losing sight of a struggle in which it still may have time to prevail. Its initial objective was to turn Iraq into a model for the region: a democratic, secular and free-market oriented government, sympathetic to U.S. interests, not openly hostile toward Israel, and possibly home to long-term American military bases. But hostility toward the U.S. and suspicion of its intentions among large numbers of Iraqis have progressed so far that this is virtually out of reach. More than that, the pursuit has become an obstacle to realisation of the most essential, achievable goal -- a stable government viewed by its people as credible, representative and the embodiment of national interests as well as capable of addressing their basic needs. That does not mean the war is over or its outcome predetermined. Nor does it mean, as some have suggested, that the U.S. ought to rapidly withdraw, for that would come at great cost to its own strategic interests, to the Iraqi people and potentially to the stability of the region as a whole. Rather, it means that Washington must grasp the extent to which the ground beneath its feet has shifted since the onset of the occupation and develop a comprehensive strategy and timetable adapted to this reality if it wants a chance to salvage the situation. And it means that the tactical achievements regularly trumpeted -- the re-occupation of insurgent sanctuaries; increased training of Iraqi security forces; formal adherence to decrees passed by the Coalition Provisional Authority and to the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL); the transfer of sovereignty; Prime Minister Allawi's generally pro-American policy and pronouncements; and even the timely conduct of national elections if that happens -- are for the most part Pyrrhic victories in a struggle that has moved on.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In Iraq, the U.S. is engaged in a war it already may have lost while losing sight of a struggle in which it still may have time to prevail. Its initial objective was to turn Iraq into a model for the region: a democratic, secular and free-market oriented government, sympathetic to U.S. interests, not openly hostile toward Israel, and possibly home to long-term American military bases. But hostility toward the U.S. and suspicion of its intentions among large numbers of Iraqis have progressed so far that this is virtually out of reach. More than that, the pursuit has become an obstacle to realisation of the most essential, achievable goal -- a stable government viewed by its people as credible, representative and the embodiment of national interests as well as capable of addressing their basic needs.
That does not mean the war is over or its outcome predetermined. Nor does it mean, as some have suggested, that the U.S. ought to rapidly withdraw, for that would come at great cost to its own strategic interests, to the Iraqi people and potentially to the stability of the region as a whole. Rather, it means that Washington must grasp the extent to which the ground beneath its feet has shifted since the onset of the occupation and develop a comprehensive strategy and timetable adapted to this reality if it wants a chance to salvage the situation. And it means that the tactical achievements regularly trumpeted -- the re-occupation of insurgent sanctuaries; increased training of Iraqi security forces; formal adherence to decrees passed by the Coalition Provisional Authority and to the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL); the transfer of sovereignty; Prime Minister Allawi's generally pro-American policy and pronouncements; and even the timely conduct of national elections if that happens -- are for the most part Pyrrhic victories in a struggle that has moved on.
Crisis Group has concluded, on the basis of extended field work in Iraq and wide-ranging interviews in Washington, that despite valiant and ongoing corrective efforts, the transition process no longer can succeed as currently fashioned – that is, as the linear culmination of the process underway since the fall of the Baathist regime. It has become too discredited, too tainted, and too closely associated with a U.S. partner in which Iraqis have lost faith for it to be rescued by minor course corrections. To preserve the possibility of a united, cohesive Iraq rallying around a credible central state, elections -- together with their aftermath, the establishment of a sovereign constituent assembly -- must be perceived by its people not as a continuation of what has occurred so far, but as a fundamental break from it. This is true whether the elections are held on 30 January 2005 as scheduled or postponed until there is greater certainty that Sunni Arabs will participate in sufficient numbers to make the results meaningful.
From a U.S. standpoint, a prerequisite is to agree on and articulate clear goals and the position it wants to be in by late 2005 (the point at which the transitional process is to end) -- in particular the scope of the political and, any, military role the U.S. will still want to play. In the absence of a public statement of goals, both Iraqi and non-Iraqi actors have projected their worst -- and often contradictory -- fears upon the U.S. enterprise. Secondly, the U.S. will need to designate a lead official in Washington given presidential backing to formulate and pursue those objectives.
Beyond that, Iraqis have to be persuaded that they are engaged in the task of building a sovereign, unified and independent state, in order to remove doubt as to the allegiance of security forces, political parties, and average citizens. In many ways, the job the U.S. must now perform is a thankless one. It involves satisfying the expectations of a population now largely hostile to the U.S. and encouraging the emancipation and independence of Iraqi institutions whose credibility will depend on their distancing themselves from it.
What is now required is dual disengagement: a gradual U.S. political and military disengagement from Iraq and, no less important, a clear Iraqi political disengagement from the U.S. The new Iraqi state must define itself at least partially in opposition to U.S. policies or it runs the risk of defining itself in opposition to many of its own citizens.
RECOMMENDATIONS
To the United States Government:
1. Recognise new realities and constraints under which it operates, and in particular that:
(a) the insurgency is not confined to a finite number of fanatics isolated from the population and opposed to a democratic Iraq but is fed by nationalist feelings, widespread mistrust of U.S. intentions and resentment of its actions;
(b) the current transitional process is not the answer to the legitimacy deficit but one of its sources; and
(c) national elections scheduled for January 2005 will change little unless they produce institutions that can address basic needs and prove their independence by distancing themselves from the U.S. and reaching out to all political components.
2. Designate a senior official in Washington with lead responsibility for designing and implementing a transitional strategy for the U.S. in the lead-up to late 2005, and if necessary beyond, ensuring proper coordination between agencies and with the field.
3. Develop an integrated counter-insurrection strategy that:
(a) is focused on gaining the population's support rather than on eliminating insurgents; and
(b) further subordinates military operations to political and economic initiatives -- including offers of amnesty or negotiated surrender to combatants; establishment of elected, empowered and duly funded local government structures; reconstruction; payments to displaced civilians; and compensation for damages.
4. Signal quick acceptance of a fully sovereign Iraqi government both before and after elections by:
(a) abstaining from commenting on the desired election date and making clear it would accept a delay decided by the Iraqi government;
(b) seeking participation of as many non-U.S. and non-Coalition election observers as possible;
(c) abstaining from challenging steps to revisit earlier decrees or decisions made by or in coordination with the U.S. and from interfering on sensitive issues such as economic policy;
(d) systematically consulting and coordinating on reconstruction priorities and implementation and involving local and national Iraqi institutions in the management of funds;
(e) transferring as soon as possible any prisoners to independent and credible Iraqi judicial authorities; and
(f) dealing with the new government as with any sovereign partner, conditioning longer-term support on respect for human rights, financial transparency and anti-corruption steps, and dismantling of militias.
5. Change Iraqi perceptions of U.S. by:
(a) commencing immediately and visibly the process of ending co-location of the embassy in the Green Zone with the Iraqi government and by substantially reducing its size;
(b) redeploying troops to ensure a more dispersed and less visible presence, while maintaining a rapid intervention capability;
(c) entering into transparent negotiations with the Iraqi government over the timetable for a staged withdrawal, including (if that government wishes) a target date for complete removal of all U.S. troops, and repudiating publicly and unequivocally any intention of establishing long-term military bases;
(d) making clear that the military priority is not to destroy the enemy but physically to protect civilians, in particular by limiting military operations that imperil civilians and altering procedures governing arrests, treatment of prisoners and homes searches;
(e) continuing transfer, to the extent possible, of full security responsibility to Iraqi forces in areas where Coalition forces would intervene in emergency situations only;
(f) refraining from referring to Iraq as a "model" for the region or the new "front" in the anti-terrorism war;
(g) adopting a more credible communications strategy by publicly articulating U.S. objectives, admitting setbacks and, in close cooperation with Iraqi counterparts, acknowledging and acting upon U.S. responsibility for civilian casualties by paying compensation and, where appropriate, taking disciplinary measures; and
(h) encouraging negotiations with opposition elements who do not resort to deliberate acts of violence against civilians.
6. Rethink the approach to forming Iraqi security forces by:
(a) ceasing to view them as auxiliaries to the U.S. military;
(b) halting recourse to local militias; and
(c) contributing to the emergence of an autonomous Iraqi force by putting greater priority on the development of its own logistical and transportation means, standardised recruitment, review and discharge procedures, independent and professional institutions, and national military doctrine.
7. Alter the regional climate hampering efforts in Iraq by:
(a) engaging with Iran and Syria in a direct and sustained manner that acknowledges they have legitimate interests in Iraq's future; and
(b) intensifying efforts toward resolving the Israeli-Palestinian and other Arab-Israeli conflicts.
To the Newly Elected Transitional National Assembly and Forthcoming Transitional Iraqi Government:
8. Clearly demonstrate their sovereign independence by:
(a) reviewing agreements reached between the U.S. and the Interim Government as well as decisions with continuing effect made by the Coalition Provisional Authority;
(b) debating openly status of forces arrangements for Coalition troops and negotiating with the U.S. and its partners the criteria and timetable for gradual withdrawal, including a target date for completing that process; and
(c) naming a credible independent commission to investigate human rights abuses and violence against civilians since the war began, in particular by Coalition forces, and recommend compensatory damages to victims.
Amman/Brussels, 22 December 2004
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