Authorities in Tajikistan are resorting to repression and intimidation as they try to contain what they view as the Kyrgyz contagion. Tajik leaders are clearly concerned that the political upheaval which engulfed Kyrgyzstan in March – when popular discontent over rigged parliamentary elections culminated in the overthrow of Askar Akayev’s administration – could spread to other countries in Central Asia. Tajikistan held parliamentary elections the same day as Kyrgyzstan’s legislative vote. As in Kyrgyzstan, the Tajik voting results were criticized by Western observers and opposition supporters as flawed in favor of the incumbent administration.
Following the Tajik election, opposition leaders threatened to stage protests unless their complaints were redressed. Tajik President Imomali Rahmonov, however, has remained defiant. In his April 16 state-of-the-nation address, Rahmonov summarily dismissed election fraud complaints. [For background see the Eurasia Insight archive]. Rather than admit any wrongdoing and seek to defuse tension through dialogue, Rahmonov has gone on the political offensive.
A central element to the Tajik government’s strategy appears to be an effort hamper the ability of foreign diplomats and international aid workers to interact with local non-governmental organization activists and independent journalists. On April 14, the Tajik Foreign Ministry announced that foreign diplomats and representatives of international organizations must provide prior notice of public contacts with Tajik citizens who are affiliated with political parties, NGOs and mass media outlets.
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Despite the muted American response over the new rule, there is evident tension in the US-Tajik relationship, connected in part to the perception among many officials in Dushanbe that the US government was a behind-the-scenes player in the revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan. Washington has adamantly denied direct involvement in the revolutions.
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Meanwhile, Rahmonov’s administration is clamping down on its domestic political opponents. On April 27, Tajik Prosecutor-General Bobojon Bobokhonov announced that the leader of the Democratic Party, Mahmudruzi Iskandarov, was being held in Dushanbe on charges of engaging in subversive activity.
Iskandarov originally had been taken into custody in Moscow, and held by Russian authorities for months as they considered a Tajik government extradition request. In a surprise decision on April 3, Russian officials freed Iskandarov, citing a lack of evidence. Upon his release, the Democratic Party leader said the charges against him were politically motivated, and vowed to return to Tajikistan to promote democratic change in the country.
About a week after his release in Moscow, Iskandarov disappeared from public view. How he ended up in a Dushanbe detention center remains a mystery. Bobokhonov said that authorities arrested Iskandarov on April 22, but provided no details on where he was taken into custody. Some local observers believe that Iskandarov may have been effectively kidnapped in Moscow and returned to Dushanbe.
The Bush Administration and its Neo-con think tank continue to play a covert hand in Central Asia. This article is published on a website run by the Open Society Institute-New York (OSI-NY) whose director is George Soros. Although OSI-NY as a not-for-profit properly separates itself from Soros's progressive political activities, Soros has spent billions of dollars exporting his visition of free society to the world through OSI-NY. Soros talks about his views on another site of his:
GeorgeSoros.com
Paradoxically, the most successful open society in the world, the US, does not properly understand the first principles of an open society; indeed, its current leadership actively disavows them. The concept of open society is based on the recognition that nobody possesses the ultimate truth, and that to claim otherwise leads to repression. In short, we may be wrong.
That is precisely the possibility that Bush refuses to acknowledge, and his denial appeals to a significant segment of the American public. An equally significant segment is appalled. This has left the US not only deeply divided, but also at loggerheads with much of the rest of the world, which considers our policies high-handed and arbitrary.
President Bush regards his reelection as an endorsement of his policies, and feels reinforced in his distorted view of the world. The "accountability moment" has passed, he claims, and he is ready to confront tyranny throughout the world according to his own lights.
But we cannot forego the critical process that is at the core of an open society – as we did for eighteen months after September 11, 2001. That is what has led us into the Iraq quagmire.
A better understanding of the concept of open society would require us to distinguish between promoting freedom and democracy and promoting American values and interests. If it is freedom and democracy that we want, we can foster it only by strengthening international law and international institutions.
Bush is right to assert that repressive regimes can no longer hide behind a cloak of sovereignty: what goes on inside tyrannies and failed states is of vital interest to the rest of the world. But intervention in other states' internal affairs must be legitimate, which requires clearly established rules.