US's 'arc of instability' just gets bigger

Pepe Escobar, the author of this article, writes his convictions. Truly his Chinese employers see their agenda served, but in this case, it would appear both Pepe and China have a point. The US has taken on the traditional role of Great Britain. The Brits maintained their dominance of the world by playing divide and conquer. The US is doing the same. Except, it would appear, the availability of information via the internet is undermining the US effectiveness.

Has Obama simply filled Bushes shoes as the world's bully? At this point I'm thinking this is an engine independent of government. Is it a "rogue" CIA operation blacked out to even Obama? Totally blacked out, probably not, but buried in piles and piles of similar operations with few directors and no accountability to maintain plausible denial ability and accessible to the new president only with time and focus. Do you thing Obama has enough on his plate?

Image by Getty Images via Daylife

Asia Times Online

The New Great Game is not only focused on the face-off between the United States and strategic competitors Russia and China - with Pipelineistan as a defining element.

The full spectrum dominance doctrine requires the control of the Pentagon-coined "arc of instability" from the Horn of Africa to western China. The cover story is the former "global war on terror", now "overseas contingency operations" under the management of President Barack Obama's administration.

Most of all, the underlying logic remains divide and rule. As for the divide, Beijing would call it, without a trace of irony, "splittist". Split up Iraq - blocking China's access to Iraqi oil. Split up Pakistan - with an independent Balochistan preventing China from

accessing the strategic port of Gwadar there. Split up Afghanistan - with an independent Pashtunistan allowing the building of the Trans-Afghanistan Pipeline bypassing Russia. Split up Iran - by financing subversion in Khuzestan and Sistan-Balochistan. And why not split up Bolivia (as was attempted last year) to the benefit of US energy giants. Call it the (splitting) Kosovo model.

Kosovo, incidentally, is known as the Colombia of the Balkans. What Washington calls the "Western hemisphere" is a sub-section of the New Great Game. The linkage between the recent military coup in Honduras, the return of the living dead - that is, the resurrection of the US Navy's Fourth Fleet in July 2008 - and now the turbo-charging of seven US military bases in Colombia is not to be blamed merely on continuity from president George W Bush to Obama. Not really. This is all about the internal logic of Full Spectrum Dominance.

via Asia Times Online :: South Asia news, business and economy from India and Pakistan.

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Officials: Obama Letter to Moscow Floated Trade-Off on Missile Defense

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Fox News

More details are emerging about a letter President Obama sent to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev discussing plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.
Though the Kremlin disputes the account, senior U.S. administration officials say Obama suggested in his letter that those plans might be unnecessary if Moscow helped in blocking Iran's progress toward building long-range missiles.
"President Obama sent a letter to Russian President Medvedev discussing a broad range of issues, including missile defense as it relates to Iran," a senior administration official told FOX News.
"The suggestion is that need for missile defense deployment could become unnecessary if, working together with Russia, the Iran missile threat is addressed," an official told The Associated Press.
Plans for deploying U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, ostensibly to guard against Iranian attacks on U.S. allies in Europe, are among a host of issues that soured U.S.-Russia relations during the former Bush administration. There have been indications Obama, who has vowed to shake up American foreign policy, might be willing to set aside the missile defense system.
The senior official told FOX News that the U.S. will continue to "consult with Poles and Czechs as we move forward with decisions on missile defense."
Obama and Medvedev were expected to meet at the G-20 economic summit of advanced and developing nations in London next month, according to the officials.
The administration has previously hinted that the policy on the missile defense shield that former President George B. Bush fiercely advocated was open to reassessment.
In Moscow, a Kremlin source told FOX News there was no quid pro quo on Iran and missile defense in the letter, but said the correspondence was considered very positive and contained a number of initiatives.
On Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov urged the United States to restore diplomatic relations with Iran, Russian news agencies reported. "This would be an important element in stabilizing the situation in the region," he said.
Lavrov is scheduled to hold talks with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in Geneva on Friday in the highest-level meeting between the two nations since Obama took office.
At a February gathering of NATO defense chiefs in Krakow, Poland, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Washington would review the missile plan "in the context of our relationship with both Poland and the Czech Republic" as well as with NATO and Russia. The language marked a departure from the tone of the Bush administration, which enthusiastically promoted the plan and signed deals last year with Warsaw and Prague.
Gates said that if Moscow really wants to stop the missile shield, it should help eliminate the threat of a missile attack from Iran.
The Obama administration has been vocal about its desire to repair rifts between the U.S. and Russia. In Munich last month, Vice President Joe Biden told a gathering of world leaders, "It's time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia."

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Officials: Obama Letter to Moscow Floated Trade-Off on Missile Defense

Image via Wikipedia

Fox News

More details are emerging about a letter President Obama sent to Russian President Dmitry Medvedev discussing plans for a missile defense shield in Eastern Europe.
Though the Kremlin disputes the account, senior U.S. administration officials say Obama suggested in his letter that those plans might be unnecessary if Moscow helped in blocking Iran's progress toward building long-range missiles.
"President Obama sent a letter to Russian President Medvedev discussing a broad range of issues, including missile defense as it relates to Iran," a senior administration official told FOX News.
"The suggestion is that need for missile defense deployment could become unnecessary if, working together with Russia, the Iran missile threat is addressed," an official told The Associated Press.
Plans for deploying U.S. missile defenses in Poland and the Czech Republic, ostensibly to guard against Iranian attacks on U.S. allies in Europe, are among a host of issues that soured U.S.-Russia relations during the former Bush administration. There have been indications Obama, who has vowed to shake up American foreign policy, might be willing to set aside the missile defense system.
The senior official told FOX News that the U.S. will continue to "consult with Poles and Czechs as we move forward with decisions on missile defense."
Obama and Medvedev were expected to meet at the G-20 economic summit of advanced and developing nations in London next month, according to the officials.
The administration has previously hinted that the policy on the missile defense shield that former President George B. Bush fiercely advocated was open to reassessment.
In Moscow, a Kremlin source told FOX News there was no quid pro quo on Iran and missile defense in the letter, but said the correspondence was considered very positive and contained a number of initiatives.
On Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov urged the United States to restore diplomatic relations with Iran, Russian news agencies reported. "This would be an important element in stabilizing the situation in the region," he said.
Lavrov is scheduled to hold talks with Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton in Geneva on Friday in the highest-level meeting between the two nations since Obama took office.
At a February gathering of NATO defense chiefs in Krakow, Poland, Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that Washington would review the missile plan "in the context of our relationship with both Poland and the Czech Republic" as well as with NATO and Russia. The language marked a departure from the tone of the Bush administration, which enthusiastically promoted the plan and signed deals last year with Warsaw and Prague.
Gates said that if Moscow really wants to stop the missile shield, it should help eliminate the threat of a missile attack from Iran.
The Obama administration has been vocal about its desire to repair rifts between the U.S. and Russia. In Munich last month, Vice President Joe Biden told a gathering of world leaders, "It's time to press the reset button and to revisit the many areas where we can and should be working together with Russia."

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Behind the Crisis in the Caucasus: Russian Isolation or Inclusion in the International Arena?

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RightSideNews.com

The outbreak of the crisis in the Caucasus goes much deeper than Russia's concern for the welfare of residents of South Ossetia, a non-Russian ethnic minority. The actual reason for Russia's invasion of Georgia stems from a clash of interests between Russia and the West on four fronts, each reflected in this crisis.
Indeed, while it was Georgia that Russia invaded, Russia's expectation was that reverberations of its invasion into Gori and Poti would resound not only in Tbilisi and Kiev, but also in Brussels and Washington. Understanding the geopolitical context and the time dimension will paint a clearer picture of the crisis and perhaps suggest directions for its possible resolution.
In most of the power struggles in recent years between Russia and the US, the US and the West have taken the initiative and occasionally scored successes, at least in the short term. In August 2008, following the incursion of Georgian soldiers into South Ossetia, Russia seized an opportunity to take the initiative and from its standpoint achieve success on those same fronts. The Russian invasion into Georgia is merely one battle in the overall broader campaign of the clash of interests waged between the sides.
The First Front: Insufficient Attention to Russian Interests in the International Arena
Kosovo can serve as an example of this front's clash of interests between the West and Russia. For several years the inhabitants of Kosovo, the separatist Albanian region in Serbia, have demanded independence. Russia, an ethnic federation and significant ally of Serbia, vehemently opposed granting independence to Kosovo. Russia feared that international recognition for an independent separatist ethnic district would serve as a precedent for separatist regions at home, for example, Chechnya. However prominent Western countries, including the US, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy decided for various reasons to ignore the Russian interest and recognize the state immediately following its declaration of independence in February 2008. The current Russian president, Medvedev, said then that Kosovo's independence would "lead to the undermining of stability and security in Europe and would set all Europe on fire."
In August 2008, Russia apparently found an opportunity to prove its claim and exact a price from the West and the US for their disregard of the Russian interest. Russia indeed has always supported autonomy for South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but the timing of its invasion into Georgia was far from coincidental. The exercise of Russian force followed by recognition of the independence of these regions, while demonstrably ignoring the stances of the European Union and the US, was an initiated response by the Russians to the West turning its back on Russian interests in the matter of Kosovo. On August 27, one day after Russia recognized the independence of the regions, the Russian president assessed, "we acted like other countries did in regard to Kosovo."
The Second Front: The Renewed Struggle between East and West

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The US and some European countries are concerned about Iran's armament campaign and the progress of its nuclear program. Consequently, the US has for some time been deliberating with Poland and Czechoslovakia, its strategic partners in Central Europe, over the possibility of placing defense systems on their territories to guard against a potential Iranian threat. In order to dispel Russian concerns, the US proposed that Poland allow Russian observers permanent access to these systems, but the Poles rejected the proposal. For its part Russia has argued that the projected sites of the systems challenge the true intentions of the US and its partners. Poland borders Belarus, Russia's prominent ally and its western neighbor; in Russian eyes, locating the systems there is tantamount to placing missile systems on its actual border.
As far as the Russians are concerned, the US insistence on keeping Russia out of the picture regarding its decision over the location of the defense systems on the one hand, and its decision to install those systems precisely in Russia's "backyard" on the other, are possible indications of a return by the US to an era of a quasi East-West arms race. Already in April 2008, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov claimed that placing the systems in Poland and Czechoslovakia without supplying satisfactory assurances to Russia would lead Russia to a military-technological response. The Russian military attack on its southern neighbor, Georgia, may be an initial Russian signal to the US and Europe of the ability of the former superpower to return and activate its military might against the West in the 21st century.
The Third Front: A Western Foothold in Traditional Regions of Russian Influence
The US views partnership with the new democracies in Eastern Europe and Central Asia as an important strategic objective; it thus seeks to strengthen the democratic regimes there with assistance to their militaries and economies. Such US activity is not looked on favorably by the Russian leadership. Russia is not interested in the restoration of democratic regimes with Western style anti-Russian leanings in its immediate vicinity and in regions that historically were under its influence. Moreover, Russia views NATO's eastern expansion with suspicion and as an infringement along its borders.
The inclusion of central European countries like Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and East European countries bordering Russia like Estonia and Latvia to NATO is perceived in Russia as an emerging potential threat to its security. Consequently, US support for the consolidation of anti-Russian Western regimes in Georgia and Ukraine, two former Soviet Union countries that border Russia, and their addition to NATO constitutes, in Russian eyes, the further crossing of a red line. But despite Russia's resolute and severe opposition, the secretary of the organization made a pledge at the NATO summit in April regarding Georgia and Ukraine joining the Alliance: Ultimately they would be accepted as full members of the organization. In response, the Russian deputy minister of foreign affairs, Alexander Grushko, said the acceptance of those countries to the organization would constitute "a terrible mistake with severe repercussions for pan-European security." Lavrov added that membership in NATO would prompt a worsening of Russia's relations with Georgia and the Ukraine.
The attack on Georgia, under the pretext of defending local inhabitants of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, demonstrates just how critical it is to Russia that Georgia and Ukraine remain under its patronage and not become military allies of the world's largest military power, the US, or its European partners. Moscow hopes this campaign will underscore to the West just how inadvisable it is to fan the flames of this regional fire and how important it is for Russia to retain influence and strategic supremacy in its immediate vicinity.
The Fourth Front: Russia's Primacy as an Energy Supplier (Oil and Gas)
Russia is one of the world's largest exporters of oil and natural gas. Moreover, because resource-rich Central Asian countries lack direct access to the Black Sea and to Europe, they sell Russia natural gas at half price while Russia in turn sells it at full price to Europe. In other words, Russian profits from energy sales to Europe depend not only upon those resources, but also on their transfer from Central Asia to Europe. Europe is naturally interested in reducing its growing dependency on Russia and therefore is working to find alternative ways of importing gas and oil from Central Asia. The most efficient alternative is to import directly from Georgia, the only country aside from Russia with a continental connection to both Central Asia (via Azerbaijan and the Caspian Sea) and the European Union (via the Black Sea).
In recent years, two pipelines were opened through which Georgia exports Azeri oil to Europe, via its port on the Black Sea and the Turkish port on the Mediterranean. The pipeline running through Georgia to the Black Sea port runs near Gori and the port city of Poti, two cities the Russians took pains to conquer when they invaded the country. But what really worries the Russians are the plans by the West and Georgia to break the Russian monopoly on natural gas exports to Europe by building a pipeline in the Caspian Sea connecting gas reserves of Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan) to Azerbaijan and from there moving onward through Georgia to Europe (the Nabucco project). Russia's first and foremost interest is that Europe's dependency on it for supplying natural energy remains unaltered and that no viable alternative be found. By invading Georgia, Russia has attempted to signal that it will allow no such alternative to materialize. Undermining the stability of the regime in Georgia plus decisive Russian influence in South Ossetia (in close proximity to the routes of the proposed pipelines) and Abkhazia (with its strategic port on the Black Sea) will allow Russia to strengthen its footing as the sole export baron for energy resources from the eastern side of the world to the west.
Summary
The current crisis in the Caucasus is the outcome of a clash of interests between Russia and the US and the West in a number of arenas: insufficient consideration of the Russian interest in the international arena, the renewed struggle between East and West, a Western foothold in regions of Russian interest, and challenge to the Russian energy monopoly. Thus an attempt to solve the crisis in the Caucasus by focusing on the status of the separatist districts in Georgia would miss the mark and overlook the true roots of the problem. South Ossetia and Abkhazia are merely indications of a broader picture signifying a crisis of trust in relations between Russia and the West, and the lack of understanding, internalizing, and honoring each side's respective interests.
There are numerous diverse issues on the international agenda far more important than the status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Cooperation and productive dialogue between the sides can happen only by seeing the range of mutual interests, prioritizing them, and understanding how the more important interests can be realized.
The contents are based on presentations by Dr. Brenda Shaffer and Yaakov Kedmi at a closed discussion at the Institute for National Security Studies.

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There Is No Such Thing as Post-Soviet Space

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David Miliband, Britain's foreign minister, wrote a well written letter to the Editor of the Moscow Times. I include it in it's entirety here. It provides some insight into EU's reaction to the invasion of Georgia. Will it be enough to contain the grumpy and paranoid Russian bear? Only time will tell.
There Is No Such Thing as Post-Soviet Space

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, it has seemed that new rules were being established for the conduct of international relations in Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. The watchwords were independence and interdependence; sovereignty and mutual responsibility; cooperation and common interests. They are good words that need to be defended.
But the Georgia crisis provided a rude awakening. The sight of Russian tanks in a neighboring country on the 40th anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has shown that the temptations of power politics remain. The old sores and divisions fester. Russia remains unreconciled to the new map of Europe. The Kremlin's unilateral attempt to redraw that map by recognizing the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia marks not just the end of the post-Cold War period, it is also a moment that requires countries to set out where they stand on the significant issues of nationhood and international law.
Although President Dmitry Medvedev says he is not afraid of a new Cold War, Europe doesn't want one. He has a big responsibility not to start one.
Ukraine is a leading example of the benefits that accrue when a country takes charge of its own destiny and seeks alliances with other countries. Its choices should not be seen as a threat to Russia, but its independence does demand a new relationship with Russia -- one of equals, not that of master and servant.
Russia must not learn the wrong lessons from the Georgia crisis. There can be no going back on fundamental principles of territorial integrity, democratic governance and international law. It has shown that it can defeat Georgia's army. But today Russia is more isolated, less trusted and less respected than it was a month ago. It has made short-term military gains, but over time it will feel economic and political losses. If Russia truly wants respect and influence, it must change course.
Although Prime Minister Vladimir Putin described the Soviet Union's collapse as "the greatest geopolitical catastrophe" of the 20th century, most people of the former Soviet bloc hardly see it that way. It will be a tragedy for Russia if it spends the next 20 years believing it to be the case.
Indeed, since 1991, the West has offered Russia extensive cooperation with the European Union and NATO, as well as membership in the Council of Europe and the Group of Eight. These outlets have been developed not to humiliate or threaten Russia but to engage it. The EU and the United States provided critical support for the Russian economy when it was needed, Western companies have invested heavily, and Russia has benefited significantly from its reintegration into the global economy.
But the Kremlin has recently met European efforts with scorn, from suspension of its participation in the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe to harassment of business people and cyber-attacks on neighbors. Now there is Georgia.
Of course, Russia can and should have interests in its neighbors, but like everyone else, it must earn that influence. Indeed, these countries do not make up some "post-Soviet space" to which Putin often refers. The collapse of the Soviet Union created a new reality -- sovereign, independent countries with their own rights and interests.
Russia also needs to clarify its attitude about the use of force to solve disputes. Some argue that Russia has done nothing not previously done by NATO in Kosovo in 1999. But this comparison does not hold up.
NATO's actions in Kosovo followed dramatic and systematic abuse of human rights, culminating in ethnic cleansing on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II. NATO acted only after intensive negotiations in the United Nations Security Council and determined efforts at peace talks. Special envoys were sent to warn then-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic of the consequences of his actions.
None of this can be said for Russia's use of force in Georgia.
Likewise, the decision to recognize Kosovo's independence came only after Russia made clear that it would veto the deal proposed by the UN secretary general's special envoy, former Finnish President Martii Ahtisaari. Even then we agreed to a further four months of negotiations among the EU, the UN and Russia in order to ensure that no stone was left unturned in the search for a mutually acceptable compromise.
By contrast, in Georgia, Russia moved from support for territorial integrity to breaking up the country in three weeks and relied entirely on military force to do so.
Russia must now ask itself about the relationship between short-term military victories and long-term economic prosperity. The conflict in Georgia has been followed by a sharp decline in investor confidence. Russia's foreign-exchange reserves fell by $16 billion in one week, and Gazprom's value fell by the same amount in one day. The political and economic risk level in Russia has skyrocketed.
Isolating Russia would be counterproductive because its international economic integration is the best discipline on its politics. Moreover, isolation would only strengthen the sense of victimhood that fuels intolerant Russian nationalism. Isolation would also compromise the world's interests in tackling nuclear proliferation, addressing climate change or stabilizing Afghanistan.
But the international community is not impotent. Europeans need Russian gas, but Gazprom needs European markets and investment. Europe's approach must be hard-headed engagement. That means bolstering allies, rebalancing the energy relationship with Russia, defending the rules of international institutions and renewing efforts to tackle "unresolved conflicts" -- not only in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, but also in Transdnestr and Nagorno-Karabakh. Each has its roots in longstanding ethnic tensions, exacerbated by economic and political underdevelopment.
Ukraine, with its 8 million ethnic Russians, many of them in Crimea, is a key factor. Its strong links to Russia are firmly in both countries' interests. But Ukraine is also a European country, which gives it the right to apply for EU membership, an aspiration voiced by Ukraine's leaders. The prospect and reality of EU membership has been a force for stability, prosperity and democracy across Eastern Europe. Once Ukraine fulfills the EU's criteria, it should be accepted as a full member.
Nor does Ukraine's relationship with NATO pose a threat to Russia. The strengthening of Ukraine's democratic institutions and independence that will result from it will benefit Russia in the long term.
Europe also must rebalance its energy relationship with Russia by investing in gas storage to deal with interruptions, diversifying supplies and establishing a properly functioning internal market, with more interconnections between countries. It must also reduce its dependence on gas altogether by increasing energy efficiency and by investing in storage technology for coal, renewable resources and nuclear power.
In all international institutions, Britain and Europe must review our relations with Russia. I do not apologize for rejecting knee-jerk calls for Russia's expulsion from the G8 or for EU-Russia or NATO-Russia relations to be broken. But we do need to examine the nature, depth and breadth of relations with Russia. And we will stand by our commitments to existing NATO members, while renewing our determination that Russia will have no veto over its future direction.
The choice today is clear. No one wants a new Cold War, but we must be clear about the foundations of lasting peace.

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Russia's case on Georgia territories: Like Kosovo or not?

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Russia's claim to part of Georgia is based on the loss of Kosovo to Serbia just six months ago. There thinking is that if the West can partition their allies, then Russia can come to the aid of Russian who are seeking partition as well. Kosovo was partitioned largely because of Serbian genocide during Yugoslavia's break-up. But it's pushing the issue to say Georgia was committing genocide in South Ossetia. They certainly were targetting a civilian population with artillery. Some sort of response from Russia probably was appropriate, but invasion, occupation, and annexation hardly seems justified. Clearly, they were using Georgia's poor judgment as an excuse to make a point or two.
csmonitor.com

The new Russian legal shift comes as Moscow's ardently stated rhetoric and emotion over the West's acceptance of Kosovo statehood is being more closely examined.
The dispute is quiet but bitter: Moscow has long made a strong legal case for Serbia's territorial integrity and sovereignty. US and EU diplomats say the Kosovo case is unique, an "accommodation" that emerged out of a long and often reluctant process involving specific moral and strategic circumstances - resulting in a new principle of "humanitarian intervention."
"In Kosovo, the West decided to make the rules on what humanitarian intervention meant, said that it had the power to do so, and decided not to stand by legal arguments in the middle of a genocide," argues James Hooper, a former US diplomat who worked with Gen. Wesley Clark in Kosovo.
Russia's new position is partly seen as helping smooth relations with Belgrade, whose claims on Kosovo have been left in the lurch by Moscow's recognition of separtists territories in the Caucasus, say diplomats. After a decade of ardent legal purity on Serbia's territorial integrity at the UN and other global groupings, Russia has suddenly changed those rules in Georgia - putting Serbia in the awkward position of having to choose between Russia and Europe, that has untold consequences for the new Serbian government.

Russia could strike Poland over U.S. shield; Georgia signs truce

Russia continues it's bluster by threatening Poland for accepting 10 anti-ballistic missiles. Since they have 5500 ballistic missiles, it seems unlikely that the ABMs represent a real risk to them, but it seems they are feeling their oats and so are ready to bully whomever they can at this time. They wish to dissuade future placement of ABMs and further expansion of NATO. Their words are intended for all of their neighbors of the former USSR, especially Ukraine.
Reuters

A top Russian general on Friday said Poland's deal with the United States to set up parts of a missile defense shield on Polish territory lays it open to a possible military strike, a Russian news agency reported.
Col-General Anatoliy Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of the general staff, told Interfax that Russian military doctrine would allow for a possible nuclear strike.
Poland agreed on Thursday to host elements of a U.S. global anti-missile system after Washington agreed to boost Poland's own military air defenses.
"The USA is engaged in an anti-missile defense for its own government, and not for Poland. And Poland, in deploying (elements of the system) opens itself to a military strike. That is 100 percent," Interfax quoted Nogovitsyn as saying.
Nogovitsyn said Russia allows nuclear weapons to be used in circumstances defined by its current security doctrine.
The Russian government revamped its national security doctrine in 2000, broadening the range of conflicts in which nuclear weapons could be used.

Meanwhile, Rice stood over Georgia's president to get him to sign a truce with Russia.
Tri-City Herald

Georgia's president grudgingly signed a truce with Russia Friday, even as he denounced the Russians as invading barbarians and accused the West of all but encouraging them to overrun his country. A stone-faced Condoleezza Rice, standing alongside, said Russian troops must withdraw immediately from their smaller neighbor.
President Bush talked tough, too, accusing the Russians of "bullying and intimidation," but neither he nor Rice said what the U.S. might do if Russia ignored them.
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev's press office had no information Friday night on whether he had signed the cease-fire agreement. Russia's foreign minister assured Rice later that his country would implement the deal "faithfully," a U.S. official said. The official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because Rice's conversation was private, said Russia was likely to sign the deal Saturday.
As the secretary of state spoke in Tbilisi, Russian forces remained camped out just 25 miles away.
Associated Press reporters had seen a convoy of some 50 Russian army trucks and armored personnel carriers roar without warning southeast from the city of Gori on Wednesday, some shouting they were heading to Tbilisi, the Georgian capital. But they veered into a field outside the town of Igoeti and set up camp conspicuously within sight of the road. The Russians were still visible there Friday.
[..]
The cease-fire document sets out no specific penalties or deadlines. It contains concessions to Russia that Saakashvili obviously found hard to swallow. Russia could retain peacekeeping forces in the separatist region of South Ossetia and another breakaway region, Abkhazia, and the forces would have a broader mandate in South Ossetia.
Even if Russia fully complies with the cease-fire, the Bush administration says there will be more consequences to come. Bush's advisers are settling on penalties that would be intentionally modest and subtle, such as continuing to exclude Russia's foreign minister from discussions among his counterparts in elite gatherings of the world's leading economies.
The idea is to give Moscow the diplomatic cold shoulder while offering face-saving leeway for Russia to turn away from a mentality the West sees as throwback to its empire days. Russia would then have motivation, and some wiggle room, to seek inclusion in Western economic, political and security institutions.
In Washington, Bush accused Russia of resorting to thuggery from another era. He insisted the United States will not abandon Georgia, a Western-leaning democracy on Russia's southern flank and once part of the old Soviet Union.
"Bullying and intimidation are not acceptable ways to conduct foreign policy in the 21st century," Bush said. "Only Russia can decide whether it will now put itself back on the path of responsible nations or continue to pursue a policy that promises only confrontation and isolation."
[..]
"The Cold War is over. The days of satellite states and spheres of influence are behind us," Bush said at the White House, before a vacation delayed by the crisis. "A contentious relationship with Russia is not in America's interest, and a contentious relationship with America is not in Russia's interest."

Russian FM warns NATO, EU mission not to use force against Serbs in Kosovo

The Russians seem to be trying to provoke a run on the border between Kosovo and Serbia. Warning the Kosovar Serbs that NATO might block their escape will inevitably increase those seeking to escape.
That can only serve a plan to start a guerrilla war.
International Herald Tribune

Russia's foreign minister claimed in remarks broadcast Monday that NATO and the EU have been considering using force to keep Serbs from leaving Kosovo following its declaration of independence.


Sergey Lavrov, in an interview on state-run Vesti-24 television, said that would undermine security in the Balkans and Europe.


Lavrov suggested that the EU's police and justice mission was seeking help from NATO forces to ease its deployment in Serb-populated northern Kosovo and to keep Serbs in the region.


"We have information that the EU mission, attempting to deploy in Serb enclaves — and the Serbs do not want this — is trying to draw the NATO forces for Kosovo onto its side," he said. He added that "the question of using force to hold back Serbs who do not want to remain under Pristina's authority ... is being seriously discussed."


Lavrov also said "there is information that NATO contingents are trying to use force" to close the borders between Kosovo and "the rest of Serbia." He did not say where he got his information.


"This will only lead to yet another 'frozen conflict' and will push the prospects for stabilizing Europe — and first of all for stabilizing the Balkans — far to the side," he said.


NATO spokesman James Appathurai, responding to Lavrov's comments, said the alliance would be evenhanded in its treatment of all Kosovo residents.


"NATO forces in Kosovo have a clear mandate from the U.N. Security Council to establish a safe and secure environment for all residents, majority and minority alike," he said. "They have done that task in a neutral and impartial way since the day they deployed in Kosovo and they will continue to do so."

Putin Warns West Over Kosovo Dispute

The Russian are announcing a full return to the cold and sometimes neighboring hot wars in it's now shrunken sphere of influence. Putin is warning that Russia will consider an military option in dealing with it's immediate neighbors, not Kosovo. I believe he's also saying, if he had it to do again, he would have moved several divisions of the Russian Army into Serbia to prevent the secession of Kosovo. I don't believe he's threaten a war, but he is signaling a renewed arms race, one that oil rich Russia just might win.
The Associated Press

Putin used the meeting of presidents from the Commonwealth of Independent States — a loose, Russian-dominated organization of former Soviet states — to lambast Western nations that have recognized Kosovo's independence. Among those are the United States, Britain, Germany and France.


"The Kosovo precedent is a terrifying precedent. It in essence is breaking open the entire system of international relations that have prevailed not just for decades but for centuries. And it without a doubt will bring on itself an entire chain of unforeseen consequences," Putin said.


Governments that have recognized Kosovo "are miscalculating what they are doing," he added. "In the end, this is a stick with two ends and that other end will come back to knock them on the head someday."


Moscow has heatedly protested the Kosovo declaration, which has sparked violent protests by Serbs and international squabbling over whether to recognize the fledgling nation.


Russia's NATO ambassador, Dmitry Rogozin, said the Russian military might get involved if all European Union nations recognized Kosovo as independent without United Nations agreement.


"If the European Union works out a single position or NATO goes beyond its current mandate in Kosovo, these organizations will conflict with the United Nations," Rogozin said in a televised hookup from NATO headquarters in Brussels, Belgium.


If that happens, Russia "will proceed from the assumption that to be respected, we have to use brute military force," he said, although he later said that Russia was not making plans for any such confrontation.


Rogozin's comments sparked quick reaction. Nicholas Burns, the State Department's third-ranking official, called them "highly irresponsible."

NATO checks Serbs' Kosovo border challenge

Kosovo has shaped into a classic East/West challenge. Russia, in particular is concerned about insurgencies within. Just how provocative the politicians will be at the expense of the people of Kosovo has yet to be seen.
Reuters

NATO thwarted overnight a bid by Kosovo Serbs to assert their authority in a northern slice of the newly independent republic, restoring control on the border with Serbia where crowds had burnt down two crossing points.


"I just want everybody to be fully aware of my determination to maintain, restore a safe and secure environment wherever in Kosovo," said General Xavier de Marnhac, commander of the NATO-led peacekeeping force, KFOR. He said Kosovan and U.N. authority would be restored at the crossings, known as Gate 1 and Gate 3-1, which would reopen once the destroyed customs and police buildings had been repaired.


The test of Western resolve to back up Kosovo's independence with military force came on Tuesday, two days after Pristina declared its secession from Serbia, a step the West has backed.


NATO said the attacks were clearly an organised challenge.


Destroying the border posts was "perhaps not pretty, but legitimate", said Serbia's Minister for Kosovo, Slobodan Samardzic, who added that Serbia planned to take over customs authority in northern Kosovo.


Kosovo's U.N. administrator Joachim Ruecker said the action was no legitimate at all. "The Serbian government is bound by their commitment to refrain from all acts that could be seen as encouraging violence and this was really violence so I disagree with that statement," he told a news conference with KFOR commander de Marnhac.


The crossings were empty for some hours on Tuesday after Kosovo and U.N. police pulled out and called NATO for help. Some 40 French and U.S. troops moved in and put coils of razor wire across the Jarinje post, where Serbs had burnt down the buildings and pushed official vehicles over a ravine. The peacekeepers were harassed by stone-throwing Serb men but held the position without major incident, backed by Polish U.N. riot police. NATO also secured the other crossing near Zubin Potok town. The NATO force commander accused "some local leaders" in the Serb-dominated north of putting women and children at risk. "Everybody has been very lucky, the way it went. But the leaders should think very deeply on their responsibility when they trigger this type of demonstration," de Marnhac said.


Kosovo Prime Minister Hashim Thaci said the comments by the Serbian minister Samardzic "belong to the past and do not at all fit with the current situation". Pristina's declaration of independence from Serbia, quickly recognised by the United States and EU powers, was denounced by Serbia and Russia as an illegal violation of a U.N. resolution on Kosovo, whose population is mainly Albanian.


Serbia has recalled envoys and plans a mass protest march in Belgrade for Thursday but says it will not resort to violence. The border attacks highlight the challenge facing an EU law-enforcement mission deploying soon to Kosovo, which has been under U.N. administration for nearly nine years following NATO's air war to push out Serb forces.


The EU mission does not have a U.N. mandate. Serbia does not recognise its authority, and Serb ally Russia has warned it will not permit any attempts at "repressive measures should Serbs in Kosovo decide not to comply". "The EU's unilateral decision to send a mission ... to Kosovo ... is in breach of the highest international law," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on Wednesday.


Russia, which has no troops in the Balkans, says Western recognition of Kosovo will open a "Pandora's Box" of separatist tension across Europe. Pieter Feith, the EU's new special representative in Pristina, told a news conference Kosovo Serbs should stay and feel welcome in the new republic but the Serb-dominated north would not be permitted to opt out. "It is the intention of the European Union to deploy its presences ... the rule-of-law mission, for police, judges, prosecutors ... that we will deploy all over Kosovo," he said. "And all over the territory of Kosovo includes the north." "It should be clear to the Serb community that we are not a threat to their way of life and they should not feel afraid."


EU defence ministers will review security arrangements in the Balkans on Thursday. NATO says it has no immediate plans to reduce the strength of KFOR, which is about 17,000 made up by contingents from 35 countries led by Germany, Italy, France and the United States. (Writing by Douglas Hamilton; edited by Richard Meares)

BBC NEWS

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov has declared the EU's police and justice mission to Kosovo illegal. He told reporters that Brussels' "unilateral decision... is in breach of the highest international law".


[..]Students in the Serb-dominated town of Mitrovica are organising daily protests at 12.44 pm, referring to UN Security Council resolution 1244 under which Serbia insists it still has sovereignty of Kosovo under international law.


Russia has already objected to Kosovo's declaration of independence, agreeing with Belgrade's interpretation of the UN resolution and raising the prospect of the established world order being destroyed.


[..]Foreign Ministry spokesman Mikhail Kamynin said that by "pursuing the unilateral scenario of solving the Kosovo problem... the European Union encourages separatism in the world".

STANCE ON RECOGNITION

• For: Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Germany, Italy, France, UK, Austria, US, Turkey, Albania, Afghanistan


• Against: Russia, Spain, Romania, Slovakia, Cyprus

Serbia/Russia: Kosovo breakaway 'illegal'

The issue of Kosovo has received very little press play in the US. But I suspect this issue, and Bush's meddling in Central Asia, is why Putin is pulling away from the West. Russia's return to the stage as a world petrol power necessarily brings with it a willingness to stand up to the west and their traditional interests. I do believe Bush's actions in Central Asia, promoting pro-western governments was provocative to Putin and helped restart a cold war. Kosovo gives advantage to Putin politically by pointing at the encroaching west.
CNN.com

Serbian government officials said Thursday an independent Kosovo would be an illegal "false state" that will never be recognized by Serbia. The flurry of statements from Serbia's prime minister, deputy prime minister, and foreign minister came ahead of Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence, which is widely expected to happen in the next few days. "For us, any form of the declaration of the province's independence is illegal," said Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister Vuk Jeremic, in an official interview posted on the government's Web site. "Therefore, any such decision will be declared null and void."


The United States and European Union are expected to recognize Kosovo's independence, but Jeremic said Serbia never will because Kosovo remains a Serbian province. "I will never have any contact with illegal institutions of any illegally declared state, such as the so-called Kosovo state," Jeremic said. Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica also said an independent Kosovo would be a "false state on our territory," and Serbia should not be expected to relinquish any part of it. Serbia views Kosovo as the spiritual birthplace of the Serbian nation. "The greatest humiliation for Serbia would be to give even indirect consent to the existence of this puppet creation on its territory," Kostunica said in a separate interview on the government site. "Kosovo belongs solely and only to Serbia," he said. "Kosovo is ours and we will never give it to anyone."
Deputy Prime Minister Bozidar Djelic held a meeting with European ambassadors Thursday and reiterated that Serbia would never recognize the independence of Kosovo, a government statement said.


At Serbia's request, the U.N. Security Council planned to hold a private debate later Thursday to discuss Kosovo's pending declaration. Kosovo has been under U.N. control since shortly after NATO warplanes forced out Serbian forces in 1999. NATO acted after Serbian forces repressed an uprising of ethnic Albanians in Kosovo with a brutal campaign that spawned reports of ethnic cleansing and sparked an exodus of tens of thousands of refugees.


Serbia's historic ally Russia also opposes independence and plans to use its position as a permanent Security Council member to veto any resolutions supporting Kosovo. In his final news conference as Russian president Thursday, Vladimir Putin questioned why Kosovo should receive the West's backing for independence when other separatist groups -- including the Basques in Spain -- and breakaway republics -- including the Turkish republic of Northern Cyprus -- have no support. Putin accused Europe of having double standards. "You've been always telling us Kosovo is allegedly a special case. That's not true, that's a lie," he said.


Kosovar Prime Minister Hashim Thaci has refused to compromise on independence.

Russia: An Energy Superpower?

AlterNet: ForeignPolicy

As Vladimir Putin nears the end of his second term as Russian president, it is clear that energy exports have become a major component of a resurgent Russia's foreign policy. According to the conventional wisdom, Russia's vast resources make it a superpower to be reckoned with. Not only is it a major supplier of natural gas to the states of the former Soviet Union, it sells oil and natural gas to Europe and it has made new contract commitments for both oil and gas to China. Additionally, as the January 2006 cut-off of gas to Ukraine, the January 2007 oil and gas cut-off to Belarus, and Gazprom's threat (again) to Ukraine in the wake of the September 2007 parliamentary elections indicate, Russia is willing to use its resources for political purposes.


[..]The January 2006 cut-off of natural gas supplies to Ukraine made headlines. The reporting indicated that Russia was using energy to punish Kyiv for its 2004 Orange Revolution and that Gazprom, the state-owned natural gas company, wanted to gain control of Ukraine's pipeline infrastructure. Energy has been a contentious issue between Moscow and Kyiv since the Soviet collapse, but in December 2005, Gazprom escalated tensions when it demanded that Ukraine pay world market rates for its gas. The government in Kyiv asked for a phased-in rate hike, but Russia instead cut off gas to Ukraine, resulting in serious downstream disruptions. Under intense international pressure, a deal was quickly made: A shadowy intermediary, RusUkrEnergo, would purchase 17 billion cubic meters of gas from Gazprom, at $230 per thousand cubic meters, blend it with cheaper gas from Turkmenistan, and sell it at a guaranteed price of $95 per thousand cubic meters. Steady price increases have occurred since then.


The January 2007 stoppages to Belarus began with Gazprom demanding a steep price increase, with steady rises thereafter to world market rates; in addition, Gazprom demanded 50 percent ownership of Belarus's gas pipeline network. As for oil, Russia initiated export duties on oil sold to Belarus. (Prior to January 2007, Russian oil had been piped to Belarus duty free; however, Belarus garnered huge profits by selling refined products to Europe.) Belarus retaliated by charging Russia an export fee and reducing the amount of oil flowing to Poland. Russia then blocked all oil exports. Again under international pressure, oil flowed freely within days.


In both cases, Russia appeared to have made short term gains: most obviously, Gazprom won the price wars. Moreover, many claim that Russia seemingly influenced the outcome of the March 2006 Ukrainian parliamentary elections in which Viktor Yanukovich, the loser during the Orange Revolution, became prime minister. In Belarus, Minsk was forced to recognize Moscow's claim to a large share of the profits from the sale of refined products and to agree to a debt-for-equity swap of part of its pipeline system. What makes the Belarus case so interesting is that Moscow was clearly willing both to risk another disruption of supplies to Western Europe and to endure damage to its prestige in order to gain major control over Belarus.


Beyond the former Soviet states, the two crises highlighted European vulnerabilities to supply disruptions and raised the possibility that Russia might use its resources to influence European policies. Soviet/Russian supply to Europe began in the 1970s and has continued virtually without disruption until two years ago. Currently, 43 percent of European energy consumption is oil, while only 24 percent is gas. Yet, gas utilization will rise as Europe limits it use of coal. Christian Cleutinx, director of the EU-Russia Energy Dialogue, estimates that EU's gas requirements will increase by 2020 to approximately 200 million metric tons/year. Of that, 75 percent will be imported, mostly from Russia. Table 1 indicates the current European dependence.


In addition to increasing its European market share, Gazprom has sought downstream infrastructure investment opportunities in Europe. Concerned, the European Union is looking both to limit the ability of non-EU companies to purchase distribution and refining assets in its territory and to force Russia/Gazprom to open the latter's pipelines to outsiders. In an effort to enhance competitiveness, recent draft regulations mandate separating resources from transmission infrastructure. The proposed rules have strong implications for Gazprom, which could not own controlling stakes in distribution networks and would have to offer reciprocal access to its domestic pipelines. Press reports at the time of the EU announcement noted that Konstantin Kosachev, head of the Duma's International Affairs Committee, threatened to retaliate against foreign investors. And most recently, Aleksandr Medvedev, the head of Gazprom Export, threatened that Europe risks a doubling of natural gas prices, if it implements the new legislation.


Even before the discussions about the proposed EU-wide policy, Gazprom executives threatened to shift export eastward toward China. Russia has already signed several deals with China and announced new pipeline projects to supply Beijing's growing market. Over the long-term, such a shift in emphasis is, of course, possible; however, effecting it in the short- to medium-term is inherently difficult. Vladimir Milov, a Russian energy expert, notes that Russia's limited capacity and technology make it only a regional supplier of energy. He argues that the great distances and high construction costs hinder the development of pipeline infrastructure to China. In fact, this past summer, Russian officials announced considerable delays in new gas pipeline construction to China, and Moscow and Beijing have been unable to agree on oil prices or oil pipeline routing. Thus, at the present time, the threat to redirect exports is hollow.


[..]Russia holds the world's largest reserves of natural gas, approximately 1680 trillion cubic feet, and it is also the largest exporter. Lacking liquefaction technology, Russia exports all of its natural gas through pressurized pipelines. Production has remained relatively flat overall, increasing by only 1-2 percent per year; moreover, Gazprom has invested little in new fields and its three largest fields, which produce 70 percent of output, have suffered annual decreased production. Company officials are hopeful that new fields, such as the recently acquired stake in Sakhalin II and the Shtokman fields, will bolster production.


Thus far the discussion has not centered on domestic consumption and supplies, which are crucial factors in judging Russia's ability to meet its forward contracts. Currently, more than half of Russia's energy consumption is gas; however, domestic gas prices are effectively subsidized. The government acknowledges that prices will increase, but Putin has declared that even at peak they will equal no more than two-thirds of international prices. Low prices do not promote conservation: in 2006, experts estimated that by 2010 domestic gas consumption would rise by 24 billion cubic meters (bcm), or by 6-7 percent per year. Herman Gref, minister of economic development, predicted likely domestic shortages of 5-6 bcm. In comments on October 31, 2006, he noted that "Russia is encountering some real restrictions on economic growth due to a shortage of energy resources." These forecasts were seconded by ministry predictions that output would grow by only 0.9 percent in 2007 and 0.6 percent in 2008.


Estimates vary regarding the extent of Gazprom's gas deficit, but most analysts agree that Gazprom will need both to develop new fields and to import gas from Central Asia in order to meet its contractual obligations. With regard to new fields, the story of the Shtokman fields is illustrative. The fields hold 3.7 trillion cubic meters of gas, but the location north of the Arctic Circle renders them technologically challenging. A year ago, Gazprom withdrew the international tender for the fields, opting instead to develop them by itself. At the time, the decision seemed congruent with other actions to ensure state ownership of energy resources, but it also indicated that Gazprom had decided to rely on new pipelines instead of liquefaction technology. Gazprom apparently rethought its position and in July 2007 reopened the tender, ultimately awarding 25 percent to the French company, Total, and more recently an additional 24 percent to Norway's StatoilHydro. According to Russian press accounts, these new agreements represent open acknowledgment that Gazprom lacked the ability and technological know-how to develop the fields on its own. It can also be seen as recognition that export via new pipelines, instead of in liquid form, would limit the market for the gas from Shtokman.


Prospectively, what is in question is Gazprom's use of those revenues. Gazprom's attempts to snap up assets in Europe indicate that it is not using its huge revenues to invest in green fields and to refurbish decaying pipelines. This leaves Gazprom dependent on cheap gas from Central Asia, especially from Turkmenistan. Second, even if Gazprom were to invest more wisely, would those revenues go to develop fields and infrastructure to supply the European market or would they go to developing sources in eastern Siberia and infrastructure to feed the growing Asian markets? A wise investment strategy -- one that would increase export capacity and develop new fields in both eastern and western Siberia -- requires a steady revenue stream. In effect this means that should Europe successfully find new suppliers, the money available to the Russian state to build new pipelines would be limited. Putin implicitly acknowledged this by repeatedly calling for security of demand, and as noted earlier, Aleksandr Medvedev has threatened huge price increases.


The bottom line is that Russia possesses huge amounts of oil and natural gas, but the legacies of poor investment decisions and neglect of infrastructure hamper its export capacity. Russia may want to use its energy clout, but its neighbors and customers further afield are increasingly wary of its political ambitions. Thus, Russia is indeed an energy colossus, but it is a giant with limited reach and standing on only one foot.

The Balkans Are Heating Up with Russian Support

Convinced Russia again is a super power, now that the US is bogged down in Iraq, he is rattling sabers in the former USSR client states from Central Asia to Eastern Europe. The Balkans have been a tinderbox for war for centuries. It continues today to suggest a possible WWIII should the US or Russia call the other's cards into play. Dubya was serious when he warned of WWIII.
International Crisis Group

On October 30, one hand in action, the UK, France, Italy and Germany -along with the US - issued a joint demarche to Serbia criticising its suggestion a few days before that the fates of Kosovo and Bosnia were tied: that if Kosovo became independent, the Dayton Accords might also be questioned, undoing 12 years of difficult and costly international engagement to patch a devastated Bosnia back together.


The other hand then took over last week, as EU enlargement commissioner Olli Rehn initialled a stabilisation and association agreement with Belgrade, the next step toward membership talks for Serbia, overlooking not only the demarche but also Serbia's continued harbouring of Europe's most wanted men, Bosnian war criminals Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic.


One week chastising Belgrade and the next week rewarding it, Europe's relations with Serbia have seemed guided by two policies rather than one. A single, coherent approach means choosing between them, and considering what is actually going on in the region right now, the right choice is clear.


The sad truth is, Serbia is back in full Balkan bully mode, once more setting fires everywhere, or at least preparing enormous loads of kindling wood, hoping this will somehow prevent Kosovo's independence.


Most worrying is its interference in Bosnia. In the 1990s, Bosnia fell victim to Belgrade's efforts to create a Greater Serbia, with well known results: genocide, ethnic cleansing, systematic rape, concentration camps, a brutal three-and a-half-year war and the Srebrenica massacre.


Unfortunately, Belgrade has never really counted its losses - including Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and, soon, Kosovo -and learned the hard lesson about where ultra-nationalism leads. Today, it is back to its old tricks, threatening to play the Greater Serbia card again.


Within the last two weeks, Serbia's nationalist premier Vojislav Kostunica - with Russian support - has not only directly linked the fate of Kosovo to that of Bosnia, suggesting that any change in Kosovo would undermine Dayton, but has intervened openly on the side of Bosnia's Serbs in their opposition to the international community's efforts to unblock the reform process. Zeljko Komsic, the Croat president of Bosnia's three-man rotating multi-ethnic presidency warned Kostunica to "keep his fingers out of Bosnia".


Belgrade also meddles openly in Montenegrin politics, actively supporting that country's political opposition in its efforts to block passage of the liberal, western-style constitution that made Montenegro a civic state, rather than an ethnic Serb state. More than a year after Montenegro became independent, Kostunica has yet to acknowledge its independence and permits his top adviser to publicly refer to Montenegro as a "quasi-state"...
[..]Initialling the stabilisation and association agreement at this time, however, was an EU foreign policy mistake. Since the beginning of SAA talks, Brussels has rightly insisted upon Serbia's full cooperation with The Hague tribunal as a condition for an agreement. True, initialling is a lower level of commitment than signing, but it still represents the EU rewarding Belgrade while Mladic remains at liberty on Serbian soil.


And as if that were not bad enough, this diplomatic gift comes just after Belgrade's threat to the integrity of Bosnia.

Serbia Turning Away From Europe, Toward Russia

Russia is moving quickly to consolidate it's gains in view of the power vacuum created by the US bogged down in Iraq. Central Asia has drift back towards Russia. Russia has felt strong enough to rein in Belarus and will do the same with Ukraine if given a chance. Serbia Nationalists have always felt an ethnic tie to Russia.
The current shared government that includes pro-European and pro-nationalist politicians is unlikely to continue it's flirtation with joining the EU. To maintain a stable government, it will have to steer a course away from Europe and towards Russia. Russia in turn is supporting Serbia's ambition to hold onto it's last predominantly Muslim/Albanian province Kosovo.
International Crisis Group

Serbia finally has a new government but one that is deeply divided between pro-Western and nationalist forces. Facing two difficult issues – Kosovo status and cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – its choice is between moving towards European integration or on to a more isolationist path. The government’s composition, deep mistrust among many of its members and the parliament’s nationalist majority suggest it will follow the second option. Pro-Western forces have suffered a significant setback, the government is vulnerable to manipulation by the security services and oligarchs, and the system of divided responsibility for the security services renders unlikely serious cooperation with the ICTY, especially the arrests of Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic. Although Kosovo independence could destabilise the government, it may surprise and last far longer and prove more stable than expected. The West should prepare for Serbia turning increasingly away from Europe and towards Moscow.


[..]Brussels and Washington should resist the temptation of appeasing Serbia further in a misguided effort to purchase acceptance of Kosovo’s independence. Since February 2007, the EU has been saying that it is willing to restart Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) talks and no longer insist on as a precondition the arrest of the most notorious war criminals. The requirement set during the long haggling over a new government – that Tadic and the DS control the power ministries – is not guaranteed under the new coalition. Some in the EU still believe that by re-engaging Serbia via the SAA they can encourage pro-European forces and ease the pain of Kosovo’s formal loss, but this is misguided. The new government will choose Kosovo over Europe; appeasement would weaken, not strengthen pro-Western forces; and in the short term at least, security structures are unlikely to arrest war criminals.


The new government does plan to continue gradual economic reforms but social and political change risks bogging down in disputes between the DS and DSS. The real point of contention between the two will be foreign policy, as the latter attempts to continue nationalist and confrontational policies. Kostunica is likely to try to hide his Milosevic-era nationalist policies behind Tadic’s pro-Western inclinations, making it difficult for Washington and Brussels to confront Serbia effectively on key issues, though it is uncertain how long Tadic will permit himself to be used to defend the Kostunica line, particularly on the ICTY and Kosovo.


The squabbling over a government deepened the DS-DSS rift. Radical leader Tomislav Nikolic’s five days as parliament speaker exposed a serious weakness in the new constitution – the possibility of a parliament-authorised dictatorship – that could become a real threat following a Kosovo status decision. The West may well have to accustom itself to a Serbia that for a number of years is anti-Europe, pro-Russia and unrepentant in its dangerously self-destructive nationalism.