What Future has Kurdistan? Regional War?

Kurdistan in Iraq has been relatively peaceful since 1991 except for a brief civil war in the mid-90s. They operate essentially an independent entity aligned in mostly name only to Iraq conducting their own commerce, and providing their own service, as well as maintaining their own independent army, the infamous Peshmerga, known as the most effective fighting force in the region. This article reviews the history of Kurdistan, divided by the peace treaty at the end of WWI between Turkey, Iran, and Iraq. This border divided people represent a major risk for a regional conflict.

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As, over time, the KRG fuses with the once-rival ruling parties, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), and trade increases rapidly with Turkey and, to a lesser degree, with Iran and Syria, the notion of a sovereign Iraqi Kurdish state becomes more plausible while making the fantasy of reunification of "Greater Kurdistan" much less so.

Kurdistan cannot escape its landlocked geography quadrisected in the ashes of World War I. The roughly 35 million ethnic Kurds are the world's largest ethnic group without their own country. Iraqi Kurdistan's ruling politicians and their corresponding corporate interests are now shuttling between the central government in Baghdad and various regional capitals to feel out which way the winds of change are blowing.

The Kurds have been caught in a web of wildly varying, intolerant nationalisms for most of the post-Ottoman era from which they have not been able to escape. The most significant of these is Turkey's secular and militarist Kemalism. Mustafa Kemal, known as Ataturk the "Father of Turks", replaced the unifying Islam of the dying Ottoman caliphate with so-called "Turkishness".

Millions of Kurds, in what would become the Turkish Republic, were to be absurdly labeled "Mountain Turks". Ataturk insisted on doing away with any cultural practice related to the caliphate, including the tolerance of linguistic and religious minorities under its jurisdiction.

The newly created Turkey, forged in 1923, left no room for "Kurdishness" and Turkey's Kurds began rebelling almost at once. The 1979 Islamic Revolution in neighboring Iran did away with the enforced secularism of the Pahlavi dynasty and enshrined a form of Shi'itism as the state ideology around which the nascent Islamic Republic was formed.

The then-new Iranian regime presented itself to the outside world as a pious Persian Shi'ite monolith, leaving little room for Iran's restive, mostly Sunni Kurdish minority. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's unorthodox interpretation of traditional Shi'itism and the creation of the velayat-e-faqih ("The rule of the jurisprudent" - considered an unwelcome innovation by much of the Shi'ite clerical establishment) left the Kurds of Iran's Kordestan and Western Azerbaijan provinces disaffected even more so.

The takeover of Iraq and Syria by Ba'athists in the 1960s led to the rise of a myopic pan-Arabism in Baghdad and Damascus that left no room for the Kurds' distinct language, culture and traditions. The Cold War Arab socialism of the Ba'ath party was, for the Kurds, simply more ethno-chauvinist demagoguery, that, as in Turkey and Iran, was bent on the destruction of their massive stateless nation.

One of the only identifying factors that these highly divergent ideologies of Kemalism, Khomenism and Ba'athism had in common was their policy of constant Kurdish repression. Internal jingoistic state policies being carried out in their respective Kurdish-majority regions in the name of law and order over the decades have now morphed across borders into external forces of political expediency unifying Turkey, Syria and Iran on the suppression of their respective "Kurdish questions".

Along with all of the external historic forces allied against them, the Kurds themselves are also internally divided by dialect, tribe and clan. In the case of Iraqi Kurdistan, these divisions translated into political allegiances that have now formed the backbone of the KRG.



Save for the very short-lived, Soviet-backed Republic of Mahabad in 1946, the Irbil-based KRG is the closest thing any of the Kurds in Kurdistan's four sectors have to an independent state. As Turkey's hopes for full-scale European Union accession have been fading into the background, Turkey's relations with Iran, Iraq and Syria have greatly improved.

Syria, which for a time once supported PKK insurgents in a petty proxy struggle with Turkey regarding disputes over water usage rights, has long since dropped all known tolerance of Turkish Kurd fighters operating from Syrian territory. Turkey has come to the realization that as much as it has looked Westward from Ataturk's secularist revolution onward, it has no choice but to integrate a higher level of cooperation with its less stable borderlands to the south and east.

Oil flowing north into Turkey from Iraq, and water flowing south into Syria and Iraq, defies Turkey's past isolation from Middle Eastern issues and may slow its Europeanization. Syria's realization that it needs Turkish cooperation on water caused the Bashar al-Assad regime to quickly snuff out its support of the PKK in Syrian Kurdistan, espoused by his late father. In so doing, Damascus has produced a remarkable thaw in Turkish-Syrian relations.

[..]
Turkish warplanes are striking PKK positions from above while Iran is firing Katuysha batteries at PJAK positions over the ridgeline from the Iranian side of the border. The Turkish and Iranian goals in the area appear to be the same and it seems to serve both Ankara and Tehran to conflate the two groups. The PKK rebels have also made statements in the press contradicting what was recently told to this correspondent by the PJAK regarding its operational independence from the PKK.

The United States government has been supplying Turkey with "actionable intelligence" [2] to target PKK outposts in Iraqi territory which the PJAK told Asia Times Online was being shared with the Iranians. Allegations that Turkey is passing on classified US intelligence to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps cannot be going down well at the Pentagon.

Turkey and Iran, at odds since Iran's revolution in 1979 collided with Turkey's rigid secularism, have a common foe in their shared attacks on Kurdish irredentists sheltering in Iraq.

Rojhilat told Asia Times Online that for the two opposing state ideologies, "The enemy of my enemy is my friend", in reference to their dislike of the Kurds in their midst.

Last week, Turkey's parliament ratified a renewal of the mandate allowing its military to continue to strike Iraqi territory [3] and further coordination with Tehran may become the norm. The PJAK states that it seeks to topple the Islamic Republic to replace it with an inclusive, federal democracy - but the group does not maintain secessionist sentiments in the immediate term. The PJAK claims to have broad support among the Kurds of northwestern Iran and the EU's Kurdish diaspora. At least one of the men I met had arrived in Qandil from Finland to take up arms against Iran.

For now, the PKK and the PJAK maintain their hearty guerrilla bases in the Qandil Mountains, while Irbil continues to look the other way. For the stateless Kurdish revolutionaries launching operations out of Iraq's hinterlands, the tolerance of their bases could evaporate as the Kurds of Iraq assert themselves and Baghdad's unstable politics continue to evolve.

The prospect of an internationally recognized Kurdish state carved out of northern Iraq may seem far-fetched at present to many, but Iraqi Kurdish elites are harboring contingencies for such an eventuality. This scenario would make quite a bitter pill for Turkey, Iran and Syria to swallow and the independence of one sector may forever negate the potential for secession of the other three.

So while Iraqi Kurdistan elects its own parliament, forges oil contracts independent of Baghdad and prepares for its future, the "other" Kurdistan still seethes with repression and rage from nation-states that have refused to accept the Kurdish realities existing within their borders.

via Asia Times Online :: Middle East News, Iraq, Iran current affairs.

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Syria pulls some strings in Iran

Wise diplomacy makes some strange bedfellows. Such is the price of effectiveness. Bush was more interested in looking tough to the American voter than being effective diplomatically. Obama means what he says that he intents to do what he thinks is best for the American people. Of course, the truth is, he too is concerned about 2012.

Asia Times Online.

Appearing in court on Saturday, a tearful Afshar admitted she had been involved in post-election unrest, saying that "brothers at the Intelligence Ministry made me understand my mistake", the official Islamic Republic News Agency reported.

The decision to arrest Afshar would have needed the approval of either Ahmadinejad or Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khemanei; only top officials can order such an arrest, given Iran's troubled relationship with Europe.

The decision to release her, however, would have needed the consent of Khemanei as it involved overriding the judiciary that had her on trial. The fact that Syria was a go-between is testimony to the excellent relations Damascus enjoys with the supreme leader.

Syria has played a similar role in mediating conflicts with Iran. In 2007, it helped secure the release of 15 British sailors abducted in Iranian waters - mainly because it had the ear of the grand ayatollah. It also helped win the freedom in 2007 of BBC reporter Alan Johnston, who was being held captive in Gaza by an Islamic group close to Hamas.

During the long years of the Lebanese civil war (1975-1990), Syria helped secure the release of American hostages, notably the president of the American University of Beirut, David Dodge, after he had been abducted by militias linked to Tehran.

The latest release comes as part of a long list of initiatives made by Damascus. Long accused of being a source of instability in the region, Syria has proved yet again that countries that can destabilize can also play a crucial role in stability.

This week's developments raise the possibility that Iran and Syria are sending a message to the world by showing how they have the ability to coordinate their efforts to diminish Western influence in the Muslim world.

Beyond that, what matters is how influential Syria is not only within Iran but also with non-state players like Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. It illustrates that US President Barack Obama - who never embraced the notion of breaking the Syrian-Iranian alliance - was right after all.

The US president does not see the merit in trying to drive a wedge between Damascus and Tehran; rather, he sees the Syrian-Iranian friendship as a blessing in disguise. He clearly believes the Syrians are a people with whom he can do business, especially as they do not have a history of anti-Amercanism, as the Iranians have had since the Islamic revolution of 1979.

Obama's predecessor, George W Bush, faced a difficult reality in 2006 when the Baker-Hamilton Report [1] was issued and it advised working with Syria and Iran to restore normalcy and security to war-torn Iraq. Bush then had a choice: either talk to Damascus, or talk to Tehran. Talking to both was too problematical.

Bush thus approved some contact with Syria, notably at the Sharm al-Sheikh summit in Egypt of 2007, when then-secretary of state Condoleezza Rice met with her Syrian counterpart, Walid al-Mouallem. The Syrians at the time, however, reasoned that any meaningful breakthrough with Bush was close to impossible, so they kept all their cards close to their chests until Obama entered the White House in January.

Since then, there has been a chain effect of positive gestures between Syria and the US. Military delegations from US Central Command have twice visited the Syrian capital to discuss security in Iraq. Syria used its considerable influence in Baghdad to get angry Sunni tribal leaders to vote in provincial elections this January.

The Sunni street of Iraq - which Obama needs to get in order before the Americans are totally out of the country by 2012 - has traditionally been divided between Syria and Saudi Arabia. As long as these countries were in disagreement over Lebanon, progress in Iraq would be minimal, at best.

Now that the two have settled their differences over internal Lebanese affairs, the prospects of real results in Iraq are high. Syria has one advantage in Iraq, however, that the Saudis do not have - a strong influence in the Shi'ite street.

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LEBANON-SYRIA: MUJAHIDEEN BLEED-THROUGH

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Asia Times Online By Michael Scheuer

Al-Qaeda's organizational goal in Iraq was to acquire contiguous territory from which to spread its influence and operatives, as well as those of its Islamist allies, into the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey.
Having been weaned as an insurgent in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden has consistently refused to commit large al-Qaeda resources to jihads lacking country-wide maneuver room or Pakistan-like contiguous safe haven. The US-led invasion of Iraq, therefore, opened a chance for the above-described expansion by al-Qaeda and its allies that would not have been possible under a Saddam Hussein-controlled Iraq.
This is the first of four articles that will assess the initial stages of the penetration of the Levant - an ancient term for a region stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Mesopotamia - by al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups. This piece will look at Syria, and will be followed by analyses of the bleed-through from Iraq into Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. The quartet of articles will seek to assess the validity of the recent claim by the state-run Syrian newspaper al-Thawara that because of the war in Iraq "the [Levant] region is throbbing with terrorists".
After crushing the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) at the city of Hama in 1982 - killing up to 20,000 people and leveling a quarter of the city - president Hafiz al-Assad adopted the traditional and traditionally unsuccessful tack of Arab tyrants of trying to use government largesse to co-opt Syria's remaining Islamists and thereby moderate their message. Under Assad's program tens of thousands of new mosques were built; 22 higher-education institutions for Koran-based learning were opened; regional sharia schools for men and women were started; and Muslim students from more than sixty countries were invited to receive their Islamic schooling in Syria.
Assad's son Bashar, however, is discovering that his father's efforts to co-opt Syrian Islamists have yielded not a tame, state-sponsored Islam but a trend toward militant Islamism in both urban and rural areas of Syria. After the September 27 terrorist attack in Damascus, an Arab journalist suggested:
The Syrian regime fell - as have others - in[to] the famous illusion that they can toy with the terrorist fundamentalist bear at the beginning of the day and then get rid of it or put it back in the cage at the end of the day! This is an illusion that is repeated and always repeated in the Middle East region. No side wants to learn from the experience of others. Toying with religion or attempting to revolutionize religion or some of its aspects and then trying to benefit from this revolution on the political level without any repercussions or consequences is the biggest illusion of all. It is the first and last mistake because if you commit this mistake once it would be fatal and there would be no second time!
Compounding the failure of co-optation for Damascus is the fact that the senior al-Assad's Hama operation, although massively murderous, was not comprehensive: the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was not wiped out. Besides members who survived Hama and remained in Syria, a number of senior SMB leaders escaped and were welcomed in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states where they found succor, academic posts, and a safe haven in which to reorganize and plan for revenge.
The bin Laden family was among the many wealthy, non-royal Saudi families that had hosted SMB leaders both before and after Hama. Indeed, Osama in his youth met senior SMB leaders on their pilgrimage, and while living in Sudan (1991-1996) several SMB members worked for or were supported by al-Qaeda's multiple businesses.
It is important to note that an al-Qaeda-led mujahideen bleed-through from Iraq to Syria had fertile ground in which to take root in 2003. Notwithstanding the ubiquitous and brutal Syrian security services, there was a Damascus-permitted militant Islamist environment to be exploited when the US-led invasion of Iraq occurred. Not only had the targets of regime co-optation become more militant, but there were also SMB remnants in the country, as well as the long-time official presence of Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and various Palestinian resistance groups.
Into this made-to-order milieu, then, came hundreds and perhaps thousands of young Muslim men from across the Arab and Muslim worlds, eager to enter Iraq and join the fatwa-sanctioned jihad against the US-led coalition. Bashar al-Assad's regime allowed these men to enter Iraq, trusting that they would make life miserable for US forces, kill enough American troops to force a US withdrawal and end up being killed before they could head for home. Washington singled out Damascus for sole responsibility for this cross-border flow of would-be mujahideen, but al-Assad's regime was the focal point for the flow because of the easy physical access to Iraq that it afforded.
Al-Assad certainly assisted his domestic Islamist firebrands to get to Iraq, but the non-Syrian Muslims who came to Syria en route to Iraq were sent by their own governments - Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, etc - in an effort that mirrored Assad's: send the young Islamists to Iraq to fight and die and thereby create a safety valve that lessens the pressure from domestic Islamist militancy. Obviously, al-Assad indulged the other Arab regimes by permitting the flow through. This is the same method of operation that most Arab and many Muslim regimes used during Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89).
Having now tightened up Syria's borders with Iraq under pressure from Washington and the French government, Bashar al-Assad is now running a country-size hotel for a variety of ill-tempered Islamist guests. In addition to long-term tenants Hamas, Hezbollah, and the secular Palestinian fraternity, Syrian security has to keep tabs on newer and not fully domesticated guests: a growing Syrian Muslim Brotherhood organization; a militant "official" clergy that is stoking greater Islamic fervor at the grassroots level; more than a half-million Iraqi refugees; a multinational assortment of veteran mujahideen stranded in Syria after leaving Iraq; and would-be fighters who got to Syria but were prevented from entering Iraq.
Among the veteran fighters are a contingent of Syrians who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan - some commentators are calling them the "Syrian Afghans" - with military skills they can impart at home and in other countries of the Levant.
All told, Assad - a man not as skilled as his father or as able to control the regime's security services - is faced with a growing Islamist threat to the stability of his regime. While the regime is not in danger of falling, it is likewise not in the same position as it was in the "seventies and eighties when the [Syrian] authorities were able to liquidate, with the use of force only, what they then called the conspiracy of the 'Muslim Brothers'."
For the foreseeable future, al-Assad and his security forces will have to deal with internal Islamist anger and threats - based on Damascus' decision to tighten its borders to prevent jihadis going to Iraq, and its indirect talks with Israel - in a manner that is not so severe and brutal as to promote the coalescing of the disparate Sunni militant groups now in Syria.
They also will have to cope with an external threat by better controlling the Syria-Lebanon border to prevent the infiltration of Islamist fighters angry with Damascus and eager to strike back for the blocking of routes to Iraq. Assad and other Syrian officials have already claimed the border is being infiltrated by violent, Saudi-backed "Salafists", "Takfiris" and other "extremist forces" from northern Lebanon, and several Arab commentators have noted that this is a legitimate concern for Damascus because northern Lebanon lies close to Syria's "Sunni belt", once a hotbed of support for the SMB.
Damascus' recent decision to sign a security-cooperation deal with the Lebanese regime shows the depth of the Assad regime's concern with the Islamist threat, but the time may be passing when either Damascus or Beirut can fully control the Sunni militant forces operating on or from their territory.
Lebanon always has been a country whose people are more loyal to family, clan, tribe and faith than to the concept of Lebanon as a united nation-state. Since 2003, this existing internal divisiveness has been sharpened by the United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the US-led international effort to drive Syria out of Lebanon.
The former opened a role for Lebanon as part of the path for would-be jihadis traveling to fight in Iraq. The latter - together with the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war - forced the precipitate decline of effective governmental authority in Lebanon, allowing jihadis to use the country for transit and basing. This made it a target for aggressive expansionist efforts by Saudis and other Salafis and encouraged the rapid growth of internal violence between political and religious factions.
Overall, the Iraq war and Syria's departure from Lebanon gave al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies an unprecedented opportunity to infiltrate their influence and manpower into Lebanon, as well as help strengthen the Sunni Salafist trend in northern Lebanon.
It is now old-hat to say that the US-led invasion of Iraq was a casus belli for Sunni Muslims worldwide, and especially among the Salafists who are prominent in al-Qaeda, other Islamist radical groups, and the Saudi regime, who are now effectively expanding their power across the Arab and Muslim worlds. A glance at the map showed jihad-bound Sunnis that Lebanon was a geographic key to infiltrating Islamist fighters into Iraq. The war itself made many Sunni Lebanese eager to assist that entry process, with some ready to go and fight there themselves.
With Syria effectively in charge of Lebanon at the start of the Iraq war, it appears that the transit of would-be mujahideen through Lebanon was kept moving by Syrian authorities and did not initially result in the buildup of non-Lebanese Sunni Islamists within the country.
The West's pyrrhic 2005 victory in forcing President Bashar al-Assad to evacuate Syrian forces from the country, however, seems to have created a situation which now finds growing numbers of non-Lebanese Salafi Islamists present in Lebanon and a growing Salafist movement in the north - especially in Tripoli, which is Lebanon's largest, most conservative Sunni city - as well as in the city of Sidon and Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps.
In addition to the growth of Salifism and Islamist militancy engendered by the passions aroused by the Iraq war, Saudi Arabia has been fishing in troubled waters by encouraging the growth of each in northern Lebanon. Riyadh has paid for the construction of new mosques in Tripoli and reportedly has assisted militants residing in the northern territory abutting Syria.
According to the media, Lebanese and Syrian sources are reporting that Saudi National Security Chief Prince Bandar Bin Sultan is supervising the Saudis' pro-Salafist agenda in Lebanon, a program which includes sponsoring Islamist terrorist operations in Syria. Riyadh's activities in northern Lebanon hold the promise of fulfilling two longstanding Saudi goals: (1) creating a viable, well-armed, and militant Sunni Salafi movement in Lebanon as a military counterweight to the Shi'ite Hezbollah, and (2) to enable Riyadh to cause domestic instability for their Syrian enemy.
The turmoil of post-Syrian Lebanon also has been exploited by al-Qaeda forces based in Iraq. Multiple media reports indicate that al-Qaeda fighters - mostly Yemenis, Saudis and Jordanians who left Iraq to avoid the US "surge" and its surrogate Sunni fighters - went to both Syria and Lebanon. They have established themselves in Lebanon along the Syrian border, in the Lebanese city of Tripoli and in the Ain al-Hawah Palestinian refugee camp; they also have built working relationships with the Sunni militant groups Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah-al-Islam. In 2007, the latter fought the Lebanese army for 15 weeks at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.
In the face of growing Salafist and al-Qaeda influence, one Lebanese academic claimed, "Security in Iraq is improving, but the militants are being driven across the border. There are a large number of militants coming into Lebanon and Syria, and our countries are paying the price for what is happening in Iraq." The academic's words are an apt description of the westward-bound jihad highway for Sunni mujahideen that the US and its allies have unwittingly built across Iraq.
As in Syria, the growing al-Qaeda and Saudi-backed Salifist movement in Lebanon's north and its Palestinian refugee camps clearly is in part a product of the militant bleed-through from Iraq. But, as in Syria, Salafism's Lebanese growth is occurring in already fertile soil: Lebanon's Sunni north has been slowly radicalizing for much of this decade - Tripoli's Sunni leaders long viewed Hezbollah as the "resistance", but now regard it as the "party of evil" - and the eviction of Syrian forces has substantially reduced Beirut's ability to limit the growth of Salafism. Bin Laden's operatives and Saudi intelligence will continue to push these trends, thereby once again demonstrating just how closely aligned are the interests of al-Qaeda and Riyadh outside the Arabian Peninsula.
This said, al-Qaeda still has considerable work to do in Lebanon. While Ayman al-Zawahiri said in April 2008 that Lebanon was now "a Muslim frontline fort", Lebanese Salafists will for the foreseeable future be more concerned with securing increased political power and communal autonomy in the country than in flocking to support the worldwide Sunni jihad.
The possibility of the Shi'ite Hezbollah and its allies winning a majority in the spring 2009 parliamentary elections, for example, could provide a flashpoint for a confrontation between Hezbollah forces and the expanding Salafist Sunni force in the north. For now, the Salafist leaders will continue to work with Saad Hariri's "Future Movement". A group of Lebanese Salafists recently told the media, "Hariri is our leader, we respect and support him." Rather ominously, however, they added, "If [cooperation with Hariri] fails, we have another option called bin Laden."
For its part, al-Qaeda will strengthen its presence in Tripoli and the north as well as its ties to Lebanese Sunni militants and Palestinian refugees. It will also continue to spread its influence across the country in a manner that will place its operatives as close as possible to Israel's territory.
NEXT: Jordan
Michael Scheuer served in the CIA for 22 years before resigning in 2004. He served as the chief of the Bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999. He is the once anonymous author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror; his most recent book is Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam After Iraq. Dr Scheuer is a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation.
(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)
(Copyright 2008 The Jamestown Foundation.)

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LEBANON-SYRIA: MUJAHIDEEN BLEED-THROUGH

Image via Wikipedia

Asia Times Online By Michael Scheuer

Al-Qaeda's organizational goal in Iraq was to acquire contiguous territory from which to spread its influence and operatives, as well as those of its Islamist allies, into the Levant, the Arabian Peninsula and Turkey.
Having been weaned as an insurgent in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden has consistently refused to commit large al-Qaeda resources to jihads lacking country-wide maneuver room or Pakistan-like contiguous safe haven. The US-led invasion of Iraq, therefore, opened a chance for the above-described expansion by al-Qaeda and its allies that would not have been possible under a Saddam Hussein-controlled Iraq.
This is the first of four articles that will assess the initial stages of the penetration of the Levant - an ancient term for a region stretching from the eastern Mediterranean to Mesopotamia - by al-Qaeda and other Islamist groups. This piece will look at Syria, and will be followed by analyses of the bleed-through from Iraq into Lebanon, Jordan and Israel. The quartet of articles will seek to assess the validity of the recent claim by the state-run Syrian newspaper al-Thawara that because of the war in Iraq "the [Levant] region is throbbing with terrorists".
After crushing the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood (SMB) at the city of Hama in 1982 - killing up to 20,000 people and leveling a quarter of the city - president Hafiz al-Assad adopted the traditional and traditionally unsuccessful tack of Arab tyrants of trying to use government largesse to co-opt Syria's remaining Islamists and thereby moderate their message. Under Assad's program tens of thousands of new mosques were built; 22 higher-education institutions for Koran-based learning were opened; regional sharia schools for men and women were started; and Muslim students from more than sixty countries were invited to receive their Islamic schooling in Syria.
Assad's son Bashar, however, is discovering that his father's efforts to co-opt Syrian Islamists have yielded not a tame, state-sponsored Islam but a trend toward militant Islamism in both urban and rural areas of Syria. After the September 27 terrorist attack in Damascus, an Arab journalist suggested:
The Syrian regime fell - as have others - in[to] the famous illusion that they can toy with the terrorist fundamentalist bear at the beginning of the day and then get rid of it or put it back in the cage at the end of the day! This is an illusion that is repeated and always repeated in the Middle East region. No side wants to learn from the experience of others. Toying with religion or attempting to revolutionize religion or some of its aspects and then trying to benefit from this revolution on the political level without any repercussions or consequences is the biggest illusion of all. It is the first and last mistake because if you commit this mistake once it would be fatal and there would be no second time!
Compounding the failure of co-optation for Damascus is the fact that the senior al-Assad's Hama operation, although massively murderous, was not comprehensive: the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood was not wiped out. Besides members who survived Hama and remained in Syria, a number of senior SMB leaders escaped and were welcomed in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states where they found succor, academic posts, and a safe haven in which to reorganize and plan for revenge.
The bin Laden family was among the many wealthy, non-royal Saudi families that had hosted SMB leaders both before and after Hama. Indeed, Osama in his youth met senior SMB leaders on their pilgrimage, and while living in Sudan (1991-1996) several SMB members worked for or were supported by al-Qaeda's multiple businesses.
It is important to note that an al-Qaeda-led mujahideen bleed-through from Iraq to Syria had fertile ground in which to take root in 2003. Notwithstanding the ubiquitous and brutal Syrian security services, there was a Damascus-permitted militant Islamist environment to be exploited when the US-led invasion of Iraq occurred. Not only had the targets of regime co-optation become more militant, but there were also SMB remnants in the country, as well as the long-time official presence of Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and various Palestinian resistance groups.
Into this made-to-order milieu, then, came hundreds and perhaps thousands of young Muslim men from across the Arab and Muslim worlds, eager to enter Iraq and join the fatwa-sanctioned jihad against the US-led coalition. Bashar al-Assad's regime allowed these men to enter Iraq, trusting that they would make life miserable for US forces, kill enough American troops to force a US withdrawal and end up being killed before they could head for home. Washington singled out Damascus for sole responsibility for this cross-border flow of would-be mujahideen, but al-Assad's regime was the focal point for the flow because of the easy physical access to Iraq that it afforded.
Al-Assad certainly assisted his domestic Islamist firebrands to get to Iraq, but the non-Syrian Muslims who came to Syria en route to Iraq were sent by their own governments - Egypt, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Sudan, etc - in an effort that mirrored Assad's: send the young Islamists to Iraq to fight and die and thereby create a safety valve that lessens the pressure from domestic Islamist militancy. Obviously, al-Assad indulged the other Arab regimes by permitting the flow through. This is the same method of operation that most Arab and many Muslim regimes used during Moscow's occupation of Afghanistan (1979-89).
Having now tightened up Syria's borders with Iraq under pressure from Washington and the French government, Bashar al-Assad is now running a country-size hotel for a variety of ill-tempered Islamist guests. In addition to long-term tenants Hamas, Hezbollah, and the secular Palestinian fraternity, Syrian security has to keep tabs on newer and not fully domesticated guests: a growing Syrian Muslim Brotherhood organization; a militant "official" clergy that is stoking greater Islamic fervor at the grassroots level; more than a half-million Iraqi refugees; a multinational assortment of veteran mujahideen stranded in Syria after leaving Iraq; and would-be fighters who got to Syria but were prevented from entering Iraq.
Among the veteran fighters are a contingent of Syrians who have returned from Iraq and Afghanistan - some commentators are calling them the "Syrian Afghans" - with military skills they can impart at home and in other countries of the Levant.
All told, Assad - a man not as skilled as his father or as able to control the regime's security services - is faced with a growing Islamist threat to the stability of his regime. While the regime is not in danger of falling, it is likewise not in the same position as it was in the "seventies and eighties when the [Syrian] authorities were able to liquidate, with the use of force only, what they then called the conspiracy of the 'Muslim Brothers'."
For the foreseeable future, al-Assad and his security forces will have to deal with internal Islamist anger and threats - based on Damascus' decision to tighten its borders to prevent jihadis going to Iraq, and its indirect talks with Israel - in a manner that is not so severe and brutal as to promote the coalescing of the disparate Sunni militant groups now in Syria.
They also will have to cope with an external threat by better controlling the Syria-Lebanon border to prevent the infiltration of Islamist fighters angry with Damascus and eager to strike back for the blocking of routes to Iraq. Assad and other Syrian officials have already claimed the border is being infiltrated by violent, Saudi-backed "Salafists", "Takfiris" and other "extremist forces" from northern Lebanon, and several Arab commentators have noted that this is a legitimate concern for Damascus because northern Lebanon lies close to Syria's "Sunni belt", once a hotbed of support for the SMB.
Damascus' recent decision to sign a security-cooperation deal with the Lebanese regime shows the depth of the Assad regime's concern with the Islamist threat, but the time may be passing when either Damascus or Beirut can fully control the Sunni militant forces operating on or from their territory.
Lebanon always has been a country whose people are more loyal to family, clan, tribe and faith than to the concept of Lebanon as a united nation-state. Since 2003, this existing internal divisiveness has been sharpened by the United States-led invasion and occupation of Iraq and the US-led international effort to drive Syria out of Lebanon.
The former opened a role for Lebanon as part of the path for would-be jihadis traveling to fight in Iraq. The latter - together with the 2006 Hezbollah-Israel war - forced the precipitate decline of effective governmental authority in Lebanon, allowing jihadis to use the country for transit and basing. This made it a target for aggressive expansionist efforts by Saudis and other Salafis and encouraged the rapid growth of internal violence between political and religious factions.
Overall, the Iraq war and Syria's departure from Lebanon gave al-Qaeda and its Islamist allies an unprecedented opportunity to infiltrate their influence and manpower into Lebanon, as well as help strengthen the Sunni Salafist trend in northern Lebanon.
It is now old-hat to say that the US-led invasion of Iraq was a casus belli for Sunni Muslims worldwide, and especially among the Salafists who are prominent in al-Qaeda, other Islamist radical groups, and the Saudi regime, who are now effectively expanding their power across the Arab and Muslim worlds. A glance at the map showed jihad-bound Sunnis that Lebanon was a geographic key to infiltrating Islamist fighters into Iraq. The war itself made many Sunni Lebanese eager to assist that entry process, with some ready to go and fight there themselves.
With Syria effectively in charge of Lebanon at the start of the Iraq war, it appears that the transit of would-be mujahideen through Lebanon was kept moving by Syrian authorities and did not initially result in the buildup of non-Lebanese Sunni Islamists within the country.
The West's pyrrhic 2005 victory in forcing President Bashar al-Assad to evacuate Syrian forces from the country, however, seems to have created a situation which now finds growing numbers of non-Lebanese Salafi Islamists present in Lebanon and a growing Salafist movement in the north - especially in Tripoli, which is Lebanon's largest, most conservative Sunni city - as well as in the city of Sidon and Lebanon's Palestinian refugee camps.
In addition to the growth of Salifism and Islamist militancy engendered by the passions aroused by the Iraq war, Saudi Arabia has been fishing in troubled waters by encouraging the growth of each in northern Lebanon. Riyadh has paid for the construction of new mosques in Tripoli and reportedly has assisted militants residing in the northern territory abutting Syria.
According to the media, Lebanese and Syrian sources are reporting that Saudi National Security Chief Prince Bandar Bin Sultan is supervising the Saudis' pro-Salafist agenda in Lebanon, a program which includes sponsoring Islamist terrorist operations in Syria. Riyadh's activities in northern Lebanon hold the promise of fulfilling two longstanding Saudi goals: (1) creating a viable, well-armed, and militant Sunni Salafi movement in Lebanon as a military counterweight to the Shi'ite Hezbollah, and (2) to enable Riyadh to cause domestic instability for their Syrian enemy.
The turmoil of post-Syrian Lebanon also has been exploited by al-Qaeda forces based in Iraq. Multiple media reports indicate that al-Qaeda fighters - mostly Yemenis, Saudis and Jordanians who left Iraq to avoid the US "surge" and its surrogate Sunni fighters - went to both Syria and Lebanon. They have established themselves in Lebanon along the Syrian border, in the Lebanese city of Tripoli and in the Ain al-Hawah Palestinian refugee camp; they also have built working relationships with the Sunni militant groups Asbat al-Ansar and Fatah-al-Islam. In 2007, the latter fought the Lebanese army for 15 weeks at the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp.
In the face of growing Salafist and al-Qaeda influence, one Lebanese academic claimed, "Security in Iraq is improving, but the militants are being driven across the border. There are a large number of militants coming into Lebanon and Syria, and our countries are paying the price for what is happening in Iraq." The academic's words are an apt description of the westward-bound jihad highway for Sunni mujahideen that the US and its allies have unwittingly built across Iraq.
As in Syria, the growing al-Qaeda and Saudi-backed Salifist movement in Lebanon's north and its Palestinian refugee camps clearly is in part a product of the militant bleed-through from Iraq. But, as in Syria, Salafism's Lebanese growth is occurring in already fertile soil: Lebanon's Sunni north has been slowly radicalizing for much of this decade - Tripoli's Sunni leaders long viewed Hezbollah as the "resistance", but now regard it as the "party of evil" - and the eviction of Syrian forces has substantially reduced Beirut's ability to limit the growth of Salafism. Bin Laden's operatives and Saudi intelligence will continue to push these trends, thereby once again demonstrating just how closely aligned are the interests of al-Qaeda and Riyadh outside the Arabian Peninsula.
This said, al-Qaeda still has considerable work to do in Lebanon. While Ayman al-Zawahiri said in April 2008 that Lebanon was now "a Muslim frontline fort", Lebanese Salafists will for the foreseeable future be more concerned with securing increased political power and communal autonomy in the country than in flocking to support the worldwide Sunni jihad.
The possibility of the Shi'ite Hezbollah and its allies winning a majority in the spring 2009 parliamentary elections, for example, could provide a flashpoint for a confrontation between Hezbollah forces and the expanding Salafist Sunni force in the north. For now, the Salafist leaders will continue to work with Saad Hariri's "Future Movement". A group of Lebanese Salafists recently told the media, "Hariri is our leader, we respect and support him." Rather ominously, however, they added, "If [cooperation with Hariri] fails, we have another option called bin Laden."
For its part, al-Qaeda will strengthen its presence in Tripoli and the north as well as its ties to Lebanese Sunni militants and Palestinian refugees. It will also continue to spread its influence across the country in a manner that will place its operatives as close as possible to Israel's territory.
NEXT: Jordan
Michael Scheuer served in the CIA for 22 years before resigning in 2004. He served as the chief of the Bin Laden Unit at the Counterterrorist Center from 1996 to 1999. He is the once anonymous author of Imperial Hubris: Why the West is Losing the War on Terror; his most recent book is Marching Toward Hell: America and Islam After Iraq. Dr Scheuer is a Senior Fellow with The Jamestown Foundation.
(This article first appeared in The Jamestown Foundation. Used with permission.)
(Copyright 2008 The Jamestown Foundation.)

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Assad slapped in the face - Israeli Opinion

Image via Wikipedia

This is pure propaganda. Israel is hardly in a stronger position vis a vis Syria with Russia. They wouldn't have to warn Russia over weapons sale to Syria if that were true. They are trying to embarrass Assad and damage his reputation with his people.
Ynetnews

The Syrian army's aging generals couldn't believe their eyes: The Soviet Union is back. After seeing Russian tanks entering Georgia, they thought that time can be turned back two decades, to the era where the Soviet superpower backed President Hafez al-Assad; an era where Soviet advisors stayed in Syria, Soviet warships docked at the Tartus port, and Moscow transferred missiles and tanks to Damascus for free. Most importantly, it was an era where the Soviet Union provided Syria with protection against Israel.
Bashar Assad's advisors therefore gave him the worst possible advice. The time has come to make Russia an offer it cannot refuse, they told him. And Assad, the perpetual rookie, of course took the advice. And so, the Syrian president headed to Moscow with a series of proposals, which the generals thought both sides will benefit from.
1. Syria agrees to Russian deployment of advanced ground-to-ground missiles in its territory as a counterweight to the American missile deployment in Poland.
2. Syria agrees that Russian Air Force jets will use Syrian territory and airspace.
3. The seaport at Tartus will be reopened.
4. Russia will be granted a friendly military outpost in the Middle East, at the gate to Europe, and go back to being a regional power.
In exchange, Assad intended to request advanced ground-to-ground missiles, as well as other weapons. His gut-feeling was excellent, and he mentioned his proposal in a briefing with Russian reporters ahead of his trip to Moscow.
The Syrian leader was stunned when the Russians slapped him in the face. Putin and Medvedev's answer to his request was "not interested." They have no interest in embarking on a new cold war. The slap was even worse because the Russians refused to sell advanced missiles to the Syrians, and added a few conditions: Firstly, they will be selling Syria defensive weapons only, rather than offensive ones. Secondly, they will not be selling Syria arms that would change the status quo of full Israeli supremacy over Syria. Thirdly, everything they sell will be paid for in cash, in advance.
The Russians know very well that Syria's economy is unstable. They know that the Iranians help the Syrians with payments, but they also know that Iran itself is facing great difficulties. Assad swallowed the insult and returned to Damascus.
Why was there no chance for Assad's "golden package" to begin with? Because Russia is not the Soviet Union. What Assad's generals failed to grasp is that by invading Georgia Russia caused itself economic and political damage that would take years to repair. Russia is a capitalistic country that relies on its economy, and the economy responded with immense anxiety to the Georgia events.
The investors who lifted the Russian economy are simply running away now: $12 billion were taken out of Russia in the past two weeks. The Russian stock exchange's RTS index declined by 32%, and the Russian Ruble was depreciated. Russia had no ability to continue this conflict.
Moreover, at this time Russia is closely associated with Israel no less so and possibly more so than with Syria. A million and a half former Russians reside in Israel, and Israel's high-tech industry is highly important for the Russian economy. The world in the era of globalization (a word that Syria is still unfamiliar with) will not go back to being black and white, and no Russia babushka will be waiting for Assad with a magic solution.

Mediterranean Summit: Sarkozy Asks Assad to Mediate with Iran on Nuclear Issue

GlobalResearch.ca

Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said U.S. President George W. Bush was not interested in the Middle East peace process and as result he did not expect direct talks with Israel until Bush leaves office next January.
Ending years of isolation from the West, Assad on Saturday met French President Nicolas Sarkozy on the eve of a major EU-Mediterranean summit and signalled his willingness to improve relations with both Syria's neighbours, Israel and Lebanon.
Assad said he did not believe Iran was seeking atomic weapons, but he wanted a political solution and would convey Sarkozy's doubts about Tehran's nuclear programme to Iranian leaders, with whom Syria has close relations.
The Syrian president also said he wanted France to play a role in any eventual face-to-face talks with Israel, but added that it was essential for the United States to also be present.
[..]France had also treated Syria as a virtual pariah state following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005, which Paris blamed on Damascus.
Assad has rejected the accusation and relations with France improved this year after Syria helped end a long-running political stalemate in Lebanon by supporting a power-sharing deal among Lebanon's pro-Western and pro-Syrian factions. Sarkozy said he would visit Damascus in September.
Lebanon's new president, Michel Suleiman, was also in Paris on Saturday and met Assad for the first time. Sarkozy said the two men had agreed to open embassies in each other's country.
"I would like to say, what a historic step forward it is for France that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad is determined to open a diplomatic representation in Lebanon, and that Lebanon should open a diplomatic representation in Syria," he said.
The establishment of embassies would amount to a Syrian recognition of Lebanon's sovereignty. Syria has long been a dominant player in Lebanon's political and military affairs but the two countries have not exchanged ambassadors since Lebanon's independence in 1943.
Assad said Sarkozy has asked him to use his influence with Iran to help resolve Tehran's nuclear standoff with the West. "We see the solution as a political one. We cannot consider any solution that is not political because the consequences will be dangerous ..." "Of course, we will pass on to Iran what has just been said, but we think that to the best of our knowledge, Iran has no intention of trying to obtain nuclear weapons," he said.

Israel Holding Indirect Peace Talks With Syria

New York Times

Israel and Syria have begun indirect peace talks, mediated by Turkey, aimed at reaching a comprehensive peace accord, the three governments announced in a coordinated statement Wednesday. The disclosure was the first public confirmation of the negotiations by all three sides.


The statement is official confirmation of what was already widely suspected of being ongoing contact between Syria and Israel, directed by Turkey. In the past months, Israel had been reluctant to make the negotiations public. But the negotiations now seem to have made enough progress that all sides decided they should acknowledge the meetings.


A senior official in the office of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who spoke on the condition of anonymity, said the talks with Syria and the decision to make them public had been coordinated and agreed with the United States. The public disclosure that Israel, albeit indirectly, is talking with Syria, one of its most implacable enemies and a sponsor of groups that both Israel and the United States consider terrorists, came less than a week after President Bush, speaking to the Israeli Parliament, created a stir by criticizing those who would negotiate with “terrorists and radicals.”


Mr. Bush’s remarks have become an issue in the American presidential campaign because they were widely perceived as a rebuke to Senator Barack Obama, the Democratic front-runner, who has advocated the kind of engagement that Israel and Syria are now undertaking.

Syria Nuclear Story a Diversion

Informed Comment

The US and Israel accused Syria on Thursday of building a secret nuclear reactor with North Korean help. There was a lot of innuendo in the press that the reactor was intended for nuclear weapons production. But AFP notes:

'They said US intelligence had "high confidence" that the structure bombed by the Israelis was a nuclear reactor, "medium confidence" that the North Koreans were involved in building it, and "low confidence" that plutonium from it was for nuclear weapons.

[..]The real question is the timing of the announcement, since the bombing happened a long time ago. It is suspicious to me that the announcement was made just after a spy for Israel was arrested in the US who had stolen US nuclear secrets. Is it diversionary?


Syria expert Josh Landis discusses a different theory of diversion, having to do with revelations that Syria and Israel are closer to an agreement on the future of the Golan Heights.


I'd add that former president Jimmy Carter's recent trip to meet with Hamas leaders has put pressure on Israel to come back in a serious way to the negotiating table. Also Hamas's own apparent change in stance on diplomacy, as Helena Cobban discusses.


Bush's own remarks Thursday that he is seeking a viable Palestine that does not look like Swiss cheese revealed some of what the administration must have been pressing the Israelis on in recent months in preparation for Bush's trip in May.


So the timing of the Syria reactor announcement does seem suspicious in Middle East terms. If the US doesn't in fact think there is any evidence that the reactor had weapons implications, then it is really a non story, and releasing it can only be for hoopla reasons.


...Aljazeera's report on the issue, which contains yet another diversionary theory, that the revelations are aimed at pressuring North Korea.

Here is BBCs take on it:
BBC NEWS

The underscoring of an alleged nuclear link between Pyongyang and Damascus certainly harms both governments. For all the talk of renewed conflict between Israel and Syria, there has also been a good deal of talk about a possible deal over the Golan Heights as well. The signals have been complex and contradictory. But highlighting a clandestine Syrian nuclear programme now might serve to reinforce Syria's isolation. Without US brokerage, any talk of a Syria-Israel deal is illusory.


Some analysts believe that the decision to go public on the evidence of the Syrian reactor project may be the culmination of the playing out of competing currents within the Bush Administration. In this scenario it is a victory of the more hawkish voices, who fear that President Bush might be going soft as his term of office draws to a close. In their view, the Americans should not accept any dealings with Syria, nor should it make the concessions required to North Korea to keep alive the deal to roll back its nuclear programme.


Such arguments appear strongest with regard to North Korea. It is clear that conservative voices both inside and outside the Bush administration see the proposed agreement with North Korea as fatally flawed. More liberal arms control experts also hold that view. "It stinks," one told me, "but perhaps the US should hold its nose in the hope of keeping the negotiating track open". So were the intelligence revelations intended to anger Pyongyang to damage any chance of a deal? Or was this a clearing of the air ahead of further progress?

Spector: Assad Wants Peace

Arlan Spector, one of the few Republicans who have shown some leadership in the past 8 years says Syria is ready for peace. He says it's largely accepted that the Golan Heights would have to be returned to Syria. Contrary to popular knowledge, to Syria, the Golan Heights is one of a few bountiful sources of water in for this arid nation.
The Daily Star

Two visiting US Congressmen announced after talks with Syrian leaders on Sunday that they had secured a pledge that jailed dissidents would be freed and said they saw scope for progress in the peace process with Israel. Pennsylvania Senator Arlen Specter, a member of President George W. Bush's Republican Party, and Congressman Patrick Kennedy, a Democratic representative from Rhode Island, met with President Bashar Assad and Foreign Minister Walid Moallem.


[..]Specter also sounded an upbeat note about the prospects for movement on the peace process between Syria and Israel, which has been frozen since 2000, saying it was now generally accepted that Israel would have to return the Golan Heights which it seized in 1967.

NY Sun: Kim Jong Calls Israel's Attack on Syria "Dangerous"?

And from another neocon mouthpiece: The New York Sun

A rare statement by Kim Jong Il's regime, which denounced Israel's incursion into Syria last week, raised speculations about a possible North Korean role in Middle East tensions. Pyongyang rarely issues public statements about world affairs, but on Tuesday, it became the only non-Muslim country to condemn Israel, calling its alleged air operation in Syria "a very dangerous provocation." The rare statement came just as press reports from Washington said Israel had recently used its air force in an attempt to document alleged transfers of North Korean nuclear technology to Syria.

I have to seriously doubt this information. Why would Kim Jong stupidly expose his secret dealings?

Starting a Middle East War

Why would Bolton be seeking to undermine US foreign policy to scuttling the agreement with North Korea and provoking an attack on Syria? Is this all disinformation, part of a plot external to the Secretary of State and the President to undermine current foreign policy initiatives? Is this part of Cheney's alleged plot?
Haaretz

In a telephone conversation, the former U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Bolton, said North Korea may be using Syria and Iran as "safe havens" for its nuclear activity.


Bolton, now affiliated with the "American Enterprise Institute" in Washington, served Bush in his first term as Under-Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. In that capacity, as well as later, he clashed with other officials, most notably from CIA, regarding Syria's nuclear plans.


On Thursday, a U.S. official was quoted as saying Damascus may be building a nuclear facility with North Korean assistance, a week after Syria claimed Israeli aircraft violated its airspace and dropped munitions within its territory,


According to a Washington Post report, a U.S. official talking on condition of anonymity said recent satellite images gathered over the past six months mostly by Israeli sources indicate Syria may be building such a facility.


Access to the information has been heavily restricted to a team headed by security adviser Stephen J. Hadley, leaving many in the intelligence community unaware of the reports' significance, the U.S. newspaper quoted sources as saying.


Israel has refused to comment on Syria's allegations, but a former Israeli official had said he had heard the attack had been carried out against a facilitiy capable of producing unconventional weapons.

Israel preparing for war with Syria, confirms general

Olmert, using a carrot and stick approach, offers direct peace talks with Syria, while preparing a blitzkrieg invasion of Syria. I wonder if Olmert can bring Assad to the table?
IsraelToday.co.ill

A senior Israeli general on Monday confirmed that the army is preparing for a full-scale war with Syria in the very near future.


Speaking at Israel's Institute for National Security Studies, Maj.-Gen. Eyal Ben-Reuven, who served as deputy commander of Israel's northern forces during last summer's war in Lebanon, said that the army is “preparing itself for an all-out war, and this is a major change in the military's working premise” following the 34-day conflict with Hizballah that many Israelis feel their nation failed to win.


The general said that when war breaks out, Syria will be prepared to suffer mass military and civilian casualties, while at the same time playing on Israel's sensitivity to civilian losses by striking Israel's home front with as many missiles as possible.


Syria “will try to hit Israel's home front in order to win diplomatic gains in peace talks that will follow, and also cause another split in Israeli society,” Israel National News quoted Ben-Reuven as saying.


In order to deny Syria this victory, Ben-Reuven said the Israeli army is training for a swift and overwhelming invasion of Syria “to knock out the areas from where missiles are launched against Israel as quickly as possible.”


He lamented that if Israel had responded to Hizballah's rocket attacks in such a manner, the Second Lebanon War would have ended much differently.

Olmert Spins Up a Win in Lebanon, Calls for Direct Talks with Syria

In an amazing flurry of spin, Olmert Calls for direct talks with Syria. Claiming Israel won the war with Hizbollah, he expects to negotiate from a position of strength with Syria.
The truth is Olmert is facing repeated calls for his resignation. The Israeli public believes they lost the war with Hizbollah. Olmert seems to be grandstanding hoping to stretch his tenure in office by appearing to be Israel's one last hope for peace. It would appear even the Saudis think the offer of peace may be for real. Egypt's Mubarak and Jordan's Abdullah will meet with Olmert in the Sinai desert, once occupied by Israel and returned to Egypt in their peace agreement.
The Daily Star

Israeli Premier Ehud Olmert urged Syrian President Bashar Assad Tuesday to begin direct peace negotiations between the two countries, and advised him not to wait for US mediation.


Olmert made his comments in a rare interview with the Saudi-owned Al-Arabiyya television station. Such an interview would have never been conducted without the prior approval of Saudi authorities.


In separate interviews with Spanish and Italian newspapers, Olmert listed Israel's "accomplishments" as a result of the summer 2006 war with Lebanon, claiming Hizbullah has "lost its will to fight Israel."


"Bashar Assad, you know that I am ready for direct talks with you," Olmert told Al-Arabiyya television on Tuesday.


"You [Assad] have been saying that you want the negotiations through the Americans. But they do not want to sit with you. I am ready to sit with you and talk about peace not war."


"I will be happy if I could make peace with Syria. I do not want to wage war against Syria," Olmert said.


Speaking of the much-criticized Lebanon war, Olmert spoke of Israeli gains from the conflict. "We are strange, we Israelis. We're sad even when we win at war," Olmert told the Italian newspaper, Corriere Della Sera, in comments also carried out on the Web site of Israel's Yediot Ahronot daily.


"The situation in Southern Lebanon is fundamentally different than it was a year ago. The Lebanese Army is deployed in the areas, along with a multi-national force, UNIFIL," he said.


"Hizbullah no longer threatens residents along the border. They lost their will for an additional fight with Israel. Their leader, [Sayyed] Hassan Nasrallah, and his senior commanders are hiding or not living as free men."

More Rumors of Expanding the Middle East War

Could Bush be still dreaming of a historic role of remaking the Middle East? Rumors persist that Bush, Blair, and Olmert are hoping to retrieve their lost support by provoking an attack of Syria by Israel and a bombing campaign in Iran. It's said that is why Bush has been pushing for a 30,000 man increase in US forces in Iraq.
Can this man be this stupid?
AlterNet

President Bush's goal would be to transcend the bloody quagmire bogging down U.S. forces in Iraq by achieving "regime change" in Syria and by destroying nuclear facilities in Iran, two blows intended to weaken Islamic militants in Iraq, Lebanon and the Palestinian territories.


The Israeli army and air force would carry the brunt of any new fighting albeit with the support of beefed-up U.S. ground and naval forces in the Middle East, the sources said. Bush is now considering a "surge" in U.S. troop levels in Iraq from about 140,000 to as many as 170,000. He also has dispatched a second aircraft carrier group to the coast of Iran.


So far, however, Bush has confronted stiff opposition from the Pentagon's Joint Chiefs of Staff to the plan for raising troop levels in Iraq, partly because the generals don't think it makes sense to commit more troops without a specific military mission.


But it's unclear how much the generals know about the expanded-war option which has been discussed sometimes in one-on-one meetings among the principals -- Bush, Olmert and Blair -- according to intelligence sources.


[...]In early 2007, the revival of this neoconservative strategy of using the Israeli military to oust the Syrian government and to inflict damage on Iran's nuclear program may represent a last-ditch -- and high-risk -- gamble by Bush and the neocons to salvage their historic legacy.


If that is the case, then Bush will approve "the surge" in U.S. forces into Iraq, which likely will be followed by some provocation that can be blamed on Syria or Iran, thus justifying the expanded war.

Bush Stirring Up A War Fever Against Iran; Japan Warns of Threatening China

This time it would appear that Bush is looking to build a coalition against Iran around the issue of acquiring nuclear fuel enrichment capability. Bush has blown his credibility for me. I do worry about an Iran with nuclear weapons. They seem to be just the sort to use them.

EU and Iran agree to further round of nuclear talks 
AFP via Yahoo! Asia News - Dec 21 1:00 PM
VIENNA (AFP) - Iran and the EU agreed to meet again in January to try to set terms for resuming formal nuclear negotiations but acknowledged after a day of talks that their differences were wide.Save to My Web

EU and Iran agree to further round of nuclear talks 
TODAYonline - Dec 21 11:33 AM
Javad Vaidi(L), head of the Iranian delegation, arrives at the French embassy in Vienna, Austria. Iran and the EU agreed to meet again in January to try to set terms for resuming formal nuclear negotiations but acknowledged after a day of talks that their differences were wide.Save to My Web

Hopes slim as Iran & EU resume nuclear talks 
IranMania.com - Dec 22 2:21 AM
LONDON, December 22 (IranMania) - Iran and the European Union met to resume a nuclear dialogue broken off in August, with Tehran insisting on its right to make fuel that the West fears could be used to manufacture atom bombs.Save to My Web

Syria has signed a pact for the storage of Ians nuclear weapons and missiles Janes Defense Weekly 
DEBKAfile - Dec 21 3:45 AM
The Damascus-Tehran strategic accord is meant to protect both countries from international pressure over their banned weapons programs.Save to My Web

EU-Iran open key nuclear meeting 
IranMania.com - Dec 22 2:05 AM
LONDON, December 22 (IranMania) - Iran and the European Union opened a key meeting in Vienna, with diplomats warning hopes are slim for getting Tehran to abandon making the nuclear fuel the West says could be used to manufacture atomic bombs, AFP reported.Save to My Web

US backs European diplomacy on Iran 
AFP via Yahoo! News - Dec 21 10:39 AM
The White House said that it backed joint diplomatic efforts by Britain, France and Germany to satisfy concerns that Iran's nuclear program may hide a quest for atomic weapons.Save to My Web

Iranian Exiles: Iran Has Underground Nuclear Facilities 
Voice of America - Dec 20 6:31 PM
An Iranian exile group says Iran has built an extensive underground tunnel network to hide a secret nuclear weapons program. The National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) says 14 tunnels house nuclear equipment, research workshops, and command centers across Iran.Save to My Web

Iran must not have nuclear weapons: US, Germany 
Expatica - Dec 20 9:37 AM
WASHINGTON - President George W. Bush said Monday that the U.S. remains committed to diplomacy to keep Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, but stressed that "we cannot allow" the Iranians to develop uranium enrichment capacity.

Meanwhile, the US appears to be helping and supporting India build a nuclear capability while it builds a stockpile of weapon's grade plutonium clearly intended to deepen it's arsenal. The Canadians are worried:

India reports progress on nuclear issues with US 
Khaleej Times - Dec 22 11:15 PM
WASHINGTON - India reported on Friday considerable progress on implementing a civilian nuclear cooperation deal with the United States.

Canada asks India to open up nuclear reactor 
SiliconIndia - Dec 20 2:39 AM
WASHINGTON: Canada has asked India to open the nuclear reactor, which the former supplied, to allow nuclear inspectors access to the reactor. Canada says India is producing a significant amount of its weapons-grade plutonium at the reactor located north of Mumbai.

Meanwhile, Japan is sounding the alarm on China and China is for the first time is going out of it's way trying to indicate they are putting away their sabres.

N.Korea says to build light-water nuclear reactors 
Reuters - Dec 19 7:05 PM
The comment from the North's official KCNA news agency comes amid a snag in six-party talks aimed at ending North Korea's nuclear weapons programs. It could further complicate an already difficult diplomatic process, diplomatic analysts said.

Japan says Chinas turning into a considerable threat 
The Manila Times - Dec 22 6:27 AM
TOKYO: Japan's foreign minister said Thursday that China was becoming a considerable threat because of its rising military spending and nuclear weapons, sparking a fresh row between the neighbors.

China Vows Peaceful Use Of Its Power
Friday, December 23, 2005; Page A14
The Chinese government, responding to doubts in the United States and neighboring Asian countries, made what it called a "solemn promise" Thursday that its growing power will never become a threat to other nations.

It would appear that the US, Japan and India are worried about a Syrian--Iranian--Chinese--North Korean alliance. That would truly create an ominous threat to world peace. Both Iran and China don't worry about casualties in wars in that they use human wave assaults that cause huge numbers of casualties. A strategic alliance with India appears the only hope to counter balence such an alliance.
The other hope is globalization. The more trade between protagonists, the less likely anyone will choose confrontation at the risk of their economic health. However, China has always thought long-term in it's strategic planning. Simple numbers predicts gradually increasing internal demand for goods to support future growth. A short term economic crisis could be contained internally by a external conflict that employs millions. China seems to carry the long-range trump card. I remain suspicious of China's intent, both short-term and long-term. They've been increasing military spending in double digits every year for the past 17 years. I'm sure the US arsenal looked particularly threatening until the Iraqi war. Now even Japan sees the US as a paper tiger.
Hat tip to Global Geopolitics.

Israel: We prefer Assad

There is some sobering news from the Middle East. Even Israel is concerned about what Bush will do next. They are concerned about Syria without Assad.
JTA

Israel told the United States it fears the outcome of regime change in Syria. At a strategic-dialogue meeting this week among senior officials, Israel laid out for the United States three scenarios if Bashar Assad is toppled: chaos, an Islamist regime or another strongman from Assad’s minority Alawite sect. Israel fears all those options, saying Assad provides a measure of stability.


U.S. officials told their Israeli counterparts that toppling Assad could be “transformative” and dismissed concerns about an Islamist regime taking his place. Israel and the United States favor pressure on Syria to force it to stop hosting Palestinian terrorist groups and supporting Hezbollah, a Lebanese terrorist organization.

This is not surprising. Bush only knows one strategy. "Stay the course." Josh Marshall has a pretty cute comment. There is nothing better than good sarcasm.
Talking Points Memo

I guess since we've never overthrown a secular Arab strongman only to have the whole thing blow up in our face, it's just hard to know whether the Israelis' concerns might be well grounded.

Update: Gregory Djerejian, a conservative, but not prone to falling for blind ideology chides the Bush Administration in his blogTHE BELGRAVIA DISPATCH:

Kiddies, let's not be more Catholic than the Pope on this one, OK? The Israelis know the local neighborhood, after all, better than a lot of chest-thumpers sitting in cubicles at our high-falutin' 'think'-tanks....and there are other outcomes besides, er, "evolutionary" ones that one can espy, alas...

Despite Warnings, U.S. Leans on Syria

Not surprisingly, Bush stays the course of regime change in Syria despite loud voices from the Arab world and even Israel worried about a fundamentalist regime emerging in Syria that will most likely to support the Iraqi insurgency.
Los Angeles Times

The Bush administration has embarked on an effort to build strong international pressure on Syria despite warnings from some Arab leaders and Israelis that doing so could lead to a chaotic collapse or even the rise of a fundamentalist Islamic regime in Damascus, U.S. officials say. American diplomats have been trying to enlist other nations to pressure Syrian President Bashar Assad as the United Nations weighs how to respond to an investigator's report implicating top Syrian officials in the February assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri. MORE

But it does seem that even Bush knows he has limits and needs the support of the Security Council, however, the saber rattling begins because military enforcement is authorized! Shades of Iraqi war preparations.
MSNBC.com

The U.N. Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution Monday demanding Syria’s full cooperation with a U.N. investigation into the assassination of Lebanon’s former prime minister and warning of possible “further action” if it doesn’t. The United States, France and Britain pressed for the resolution following last week’s tough report by the U.N. investigating commission, which implicated top Syrian and Lebanese security officials in the Feb. 14 bombing that killed Rafik Hariri and 20 others. The report also accused Syria of not cooperating fully with the inquiry.


The three co-sponsors agreed to drop a direct threat of sanctions against Syria in order to get support from Russia and China, which opposed sanctions while the investigation is still under way. Nonetheless, the resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, which is militarily enforceable. MORE

But perhaps Assad has some options left for him, assuming he is as ruthless as his father and willing to risk a quick consolidation of power followed by rapid moderation of political policies.
The Daily Star

The political storm caused by the Mehlis report into the assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri has, paradoxically, provided Syria's President Bashar Assad with a golden opportunity. For the first time since he came to power in 2000, he has a unique chance to impose his authority on rival power centers and emerge as the real ruler of Syria.


In their different ways, both the international community and his own public are urging him to act. They are encouraging him to carry out a "corrective movement" against undisciplined barons of his regime, including men close to him, similar to the palace coup which brought his late father, Hafez Assad, to power in 1970. The choice before Assad is clear: either continue to claim that Syria is innocent of the murder of Hariri and that the charges in the Mehlis report are unsound and politically motivated or recognize that mistakes have been made and carry out a purge of the top security officials named in the report.


The first course would inevitably condemn the regime to international isolation and to wide-ranging sanctions, including the freezing of overseas assets of its leading members, a travel ban, and possibly even the issue of international arrest warrants. A destabilized Syria would then be vulnerable to attempts at "regime change" by its enemies.


In contrast, the second course would stabilize the country and the wider region, and win Assad immediate domestic and international support. But to manage a crisis of such unprecedented proportions, Assad would need to display unusual qualities of courage and political acumen. This is the most difficult moment in the president's career. Moreover, he is under pressure to act fast. It is likely that the window of opportunity will be open for only the next few weeks. The United Nations has given Mehlis until December 15 to complete his investigations and submit a more detailed report. Within this limited time-frame, Assad will enjoy a certain freedom of maneuver, largely for the following reasons:


First, although the Mehlis report confirmed his quarrel with Hariri, it did not suggest that he was personally implicated in the murder; second, members of the Security Council have asked Syria to conduct its own investigation into the murder, which Damascus has, in fact, now agreed to do so. This is a clear signal from the international community urging Assad to act; third, tens of thousands of people came out on the streets of Damascus, Aleppo and other cities last week in support of Assad. Although it was not clear whether the demonstrations were organized by the security services, the Baath Party or Assad's own men, the message was clear. The public wants the president to show strength to protect the country from enemies abroad and wild men at home; fourth, even the so-called "patriotic opposition" is ready to back the president against external, largely American, pressures, if he undertakes to clean up corruption and crime, rein in the security services, and give more space to civil rights activists; and fifth, by far the most important factor in Assad's favor is the support he appears to enjoy from the commanders of Syria's armored and mechanized divisions, and from the elite Republican Guard. Among staunch Assad loyalists, for example, is Manaf Tlass, a prominent officer in the Republican Guard, and the son of the former long-serving Defense Minister Mustafa Tlass.


The Syrian Army is a highly secretive organization. The names of the most influential and powerful officers are largely unknown. But the army remains the guardian of the state's legitimacy. Its chiefs were not implicated in the Mehlis report. They obeyed the political leadership in withdrawing from Lebanon. Today, they have a vital role in defending the country's institutions, including the presidency itself.


Observers of the Syrian scene believe that the backing of these men could allow Assad to face down his younger brother, Maher, who commands a powerful praetorian unit, the 4th Corps, which controls the immediate approaches to the capital. If a confrontation were to occur between the brothers, it would be a replay of the clash in 1984 between Assad and his younger brother Rifaat, who at the time also commanded a powerful unit known as the Defense Companies. That confrontation ended in Hafez Assad's triumph and Rifaat's eventual exile.


This is a moment of great fluidity in Syrian affairs. The present situation is untenable. The country is expecting some sort of a showdown between rival forces. In these difficult times, the inclination is to keep one's head down and not take sides. For example, leading luminaries of the Baath Party have not spoken. The new Regional Command formed after the party congress last summer has so far not issued a statement in support of Assad, who is the party's secretary-general. MORE

Control of the government and the military makes him stronger than he is now. Could he then afford to decentralize power and work towards elections? We can only wait and see.