This new binding resolution will prevent the government from renewing the U.N. mandate without the parliament's permission. They'll need to come back to us by the end of the year, and we will definitely refuse to extend the U.N. mandate without conditions.... There will be no such a thing as a blank check for renewing the U.N. mandate anymore, any renewal will be attached to a timetable for a complete withdrawal."
Malaki is expected to veto the resolution.
Contrary to US disinformation campaigns that insisted that Moqtada al-Sadr was hiding in Iran, he was in fact building his coalition with the Sunnis and negotiating with insurgents who sought to isolate Salafi insurgents associated with Al Qaeda. Wouldn't it be interesting to see the future of a united Iraq come together through the efforts of Sadr, a man who the US has worked hard to isolate and discredit.
The following article that purports to give a history of Sadr's coalition building efforts, while apparently at least partially true, appears to contain elements of another attempt to discredit Sadr, this time alleging the Mahdi Army might join the insurgency. I find that part highly unlikely. But, all the negative attention that the US has given Sadr has only strengthened his political position and served to recruit more Shia to the Mahdi Army. While I suppose it is possible that US intelligence sought to strengthen Sadr by villifying him, I just don't give them that much credit. Shrewd moves is not what the Pentagon is known for these days.
Financial Express
Nationalist Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr's bid to unite Sunnis and Shiites on the basis of a common demand for withdrawal of U.S. occupation forces, reported last weekend by the Washington Post's Sudarsan Raghavan, seems likely to get a positive response from Sunni armed resistance.
An account given Pentagon officials by a military officer recently returned from Iraq suggests that Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province, who have generally reflected the views of the Sunni armed resistance there, are open to working with Sadr.
Sadr's aides say he was encouraged to launch the new cross-sectarian initiative by the increasingly violent opposition from nationalist Sunni insurgents to the jihadists aligned with Al Qaeda. One of his top aides, Ahmed Shaibani, recalled that the George W. Bush administration was arguing that a timetable was unacceptable because of the danger of Al Qaeda taking advantage of a withdrawal. Shaibani told Raghavan that sectarian peace could be advanced if both Sadr's Mahdi Army and Sunni insurgent groups could unite to weaken Al Qaeda.
[..]The talks with Sunni resistance leaders have been coordinated with a series of other moves by Sadr since early February. Although many members of Sadr's Mahdi Army have been involved in sectarian killings and intimidation of Sunnis in Baghdad, Sadr has taken what appears to be a decisive step to break with those in his movement who have been linked to sectarian violence. Over the past three months, he has expelled at least 600 men from the Mahdi Army who were accused of murder and other violations of Sadr's policy, according to Raghavan.
[..]Sadr's decision in mid-April to pull his representatives out of the al-Maliki government also appears to have been aimed in part at clearing the way for an agreement with the Sunni insurgents. Leaders of those organisations have said they would not accept the U.S.-sponsored government in any peace negotiations with the United States.
U.S. officials have been quietly trying to counter Sadr's approach to the Sunni insurgents by discrediting him. Sadr went underground in February, fearing an attempt by U.S. forces to capture or kill him, and the U.S. official line on Sadr since then has been the persistent claim that he has left Iraq to take refuge in Iran. That appears to be an attempt to feed into Sunni suspicions of all Shiite leaders as agents of Iran.
Sadr's aides have repeatedly denied that Sadr has left the country. The speed with which Sadr's strategy has unfolded in recent months suggests that he has remained in close contact with his organisation. Relying on electronic communication with Sadr outside Iraq would be highly risky, given the well- known capability of U.S. intelligence to intercept any such calls.
[..]The officer also reported that Sunni tribal sheiks have explicitly disavowed the notion that Sadr is a pawn of the Iranians, insisting instead that he doesn't like either Iran or the newly-renamed Supreme Islamic Council of Iraq, which was created in Iran and supported by Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.
They said Sadr hopes such provocative United States actions will ultimately result in a new Shiite resistance war against U.S. forces, and they urge swift withdrawal to avoid that outcome.
Sadr's project for a Sunni-Shiite united front against both Al Qaeda and U.S. occupation offers a potential basis for an eventual settlement of the sectarian civil war in Iraq as well as for U.S. withdrawal. But it could also be the basis for a new and more deadly phase of fighting if Sadr returns once more to military resistance.
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