Dubya's Somalia Devolves

Dubya's foreign policy has been a disaster. Somali is a good example. A Muslim fundamentalist regime was the only likely successful government to stabilize Somalia. Because there were a few Al Qaeda sympathizers in their ranks, then they had to be all bad. The truth is there are no good guys left in Somalia. The only group with any hope of leading must engender the kind of loyalty that comes automatically for many Islamists.
Constructive engagement has been a tried and true diplomatic way to influence a government toward mutually favorable policies. It's time to make constructive engagement as the center piece of American foreign policy. Dubya, we can't just kill everyone we disagree with, duh!
The Daily Star

Repeated regional and internecine violence, which has now spanned 16 years and been worsened by nearly a year of bloody insurgency, has left Mogadishu in ruins, with most basic services completely wiped out.


The remaining residents in Mogadishu, many were driven out by the heavy fighting last month, eek out a living, making do with nearly nothing. Despite efforts by the government to make the city more livable, by painting buildings - those that have survived years of shelling - and clearing and cleaning certain areas, garbage heaps make up much of city's features, and water and electricity remain a luxury.


[..]The fighting has killed hundreds of people this year and sparked a dire humanitarian crisis described by the United Nations as Africa's worst. Nearly 200,000 people fled the war-wracked capital during the latest clashed in November, and at least 600,000 others have been displaced from Mogadishu since February. The latest clashes on Sunday claimed the life of a civilian and wounded three others.

The outcome was predictable from the begining. Ethiopia's invasion was doom from the start. Dubya's financing of it just filtered into the wrong pockets as usual.
PINR

In PINR's judgment, the power struggle within the T.F.G. has ended with its devolution into factionalism and a government divided between Yusuf -- an irreparably failed boss -- and Hussein -- an appeaser without a power base; both are weak and appear to have no possibility of providing national leadership. Yusuf is no longer the protagonist and Hussein is incapable of replacing him; the last piece of Somalia's devolution is in place.


As the T.F.G. collapsed, the patterns of devolution described by PINR in its reports throughout 2007 persisted and deepened. The insurgency against the Ethiopian occupiers and allied T.F.G. forces continues despite an Ethiopian attempt to mount a brutal crackdown and has spread beyond Mogadishu to other regions. The political opposition to the T.F.G. remains intransigent in its demand that Ethiopian forces withdraw from Somalia before it will negotiate on power-sharing. Tensions remain high between Somaliland and Puntland over their conflicting territorial claims. Some regions in Somalia have competing governments, extortionate roadblocks have proliferated, inter-clan conflicts over water and pasture persist, piracy and crime have risen, and there is a humanitarian crisis brought about by the Ethiopian crackdown, which created hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons. Independent media are being suppressed. The donor powers continue to call for broad-based power-sharing in the T.F.G. and for more contributions to the weak African Union peacekeeping force in Mogadishu, to no avail and with no relevance to the actual situation. PINR sees no need to document the above conditions in detail, since they simply prolong a familiar pattern.


With Somalia devolved, the ball is in the court of the external actors, who no longer form a single team. Desperate to pull out, Addis Ababa lost an ally when it forced Gedi out and received in return a "neutral" anxious to please the donor powers. Look for Addis Ababa to be forced to lower its profile as a result of its weakened position. The donor powers are caught between persisting in supporting the T.F.G., which has lost every shred of its unity; devising a new strategy; or pulling back.


A new strategy, the outlines of which have been floated by some strategists in the U.S. military, would be to cantonize Somalia in order to isolate and encircle its most unstable regions; that would involve as its central feature diplomatic recognition of Somaliland and an abandonment of the T.F.G. and of any possibility of a Somali state. Were a cantonization strategy to be pursued, its success would depend on substantial reconstruction aid for the most stable areas, which, in PINR's judgment, would be unlikely to be forthcoming.


Cantonization is simply a return to pre-Courts Somalia, as are continued support for a collapsed T.F.G. and pulling back. There is no present actionable strategy that does not lead back to devolution.