Ike: The Bomb Was Unnecessary

In view of my post last night about nuclear bunker busters, I found a very interesting tidbit of US history in a Pakistani newspaper that I'd never heard. The quote from Eisenhower was particularly stunning.
Daily Times - Abbas Rashid

That the United States itself is moving in the direction of developing deep-earth penetration “bunker-buster” nuclear weapons does not help the world move towards a safer nuclear future.


At this point we should remind ourselves that the only time nuclear bombs were used militarily, it was unnecessary to do so. There is ample evidence that there was no need to employ the atom bomb against Japan as it posed no real threat to the allies and was likely to surrender before long. The decision to carry out the bombing had more to do with ensuring that the advancing Soviet forces were kept out of Japan and to put the final stamp of authority on the US’ position and place in the post-war world, as the war in Europe had already ended.


If many in the US still believe that the bombing was justified it is in part due to a determined effort by the Right to sustain the myth of necessity. Ten years ago, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Second World War, the Smithsonian Institution decided to hold an exhibition that would include the fuselage of the Enola Gay, the B-29 US Air Force warplane that had dropped the bomb destroying the entire city and leading to a death toll, eventually, of 140,000.


But the exhibition became a highly controversial issue because of the management’s decision to allow for different perspectives on the event at the venue. Remarkably, what the detractors objected to were not the views at the time of dissident intellectuals but military men such as General Dwight D Eisenhower and Fleet Admiral William D Leahy. They opposed the use of the bomb, particularly without warning and against non-combatant civilian populations. Of course they were among the few, along with a select group of scientists, who were aware of the terrible destructive power of the bomb. According to one poll a majority of people in the US did not oppose the use of the bomb against Japan. Significantly, however, an earlier poll had found that they were opposed to the use of poison gas. The latter weapon having been used in the First World War, its consequences were fairly common knowledge.


In his memoirs Eisenhower recounts telling Secretary of War Henry Stimson about his misgivings, “First on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary and secondly, because I thought that our country would avoid shocking world opinion by the use of what was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was at that very moment seeking some way to surrender with minimum loss of ‘face’.”


Similarly Leahy wrote, “The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender.” (Hiroshima’s Shadow, editors Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifschultz, 1996.) It needs to be pointed out that many of those opposed to the bomb had not been particularly critical of the indiscriminate firebombing of cities like Dresden and Tokyo that caused heavy civilian casualties. But, even for them, a line was being crossed.


The Franck Report of June 11, 1945 that included scientists like Leo Szilard, the Hungarian-born physicist who had favoured the launch of the A-bomb project, counselled against using the bomb: “We believe — the use of nuclear bombs for an early, unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable. If the United States would be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race of armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.”


In much the same vein in a memorandum to the secretary of war, Ralph A Bard, the undersecretary of the Navy, argued that if the bomb had to be used against Japan that country must be given some preliminary warning, reaffirming that Japan was unlikely to hold out for long: “During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be serving for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender.”


The warning proposal was in line with the thinking of a few like Szilard that a city like Hiroshima could be evacuated and then bombed to demonstrate the havoc an A-bomb could wreak, expediting Japanese surrender.


Had the US government heeded the important voices at the time in the US that were counselling restraint with respect to the use of the A-bomb, the enterprise of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world may have followed a different trajectory; without significantly affecting either the outcome of the war or indeed the post-war balance of power.

Complete Article
Daily Times - Site Edition Sunday, August 14, 2005
VIEW: Hiroshima and the road not taken —Abbas Rashid
Had the US government heeded the important voices at the time in the US that were counselling restraint with respect to the use of the A-bomb, the enterprise of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world may have followed a different trajectory
The 60th anniversary of the dropping of the atom bomb by the US on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki comes at a time when the nuclear issue is centre-stage, once again. The E-3 negotiations with Iran, with the US in the background, are at a low point. The invasion of Iraq (where no nuclear weapons were discovered) and the restraint demonstrated towards North Korea that is widely suspected of possessing such weapons, not to mention the absence of any discussion over Israel’s formidable nuclear arsenal, is unlikely to encourage states to eschew the nuclear option.
That the United States itself is moving in the direction of developing deep-earth penetration “bunker-buster” nuclear weapons does not help the world move towards a safer nuclear future.
At this point we should remind ourselves that the only time nuclear bombs were used militarily, it was unnecessary to do so. There is ample evidence that there was no need to employ the atom bomb against Japan as it posed no real threat to the allies and was likely to surrender before long. The decision to carry out the bombing had more to do with ensuring that the advancing Soviet forces were kept out of Japan and to put the final stamp of authority on the US’ position and place in the post-war world, as the war in Europe had already ended.
If many in the US still believe that the bombing was justified it is in part due to a determined effort by the Right to sustain the myth of necessity. Ten years ago, to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Second World War, the Smithsonian Institution decided to hold an exhibition that would include the fuselage of the Enola Gay, the B-29 US Air Force warplane that had dropped the bomb destroying the entire city and leading to a death toll, eventually, of 140,000.
But the exhibition became a highly controversial issue because of the management’s decision to allow for different perspectives on the event at the venue. Remarkably, what the detractors objected to were not the views at the time of dissident intellectuals but military men such as General Dwight D Eisenhower and Fleet Admiral William D Leahy. They opposed the use of the bomb, particularly without warning and against non-combatant civilian populations.
Of course they were among the few, along with a select group of scientists, who were aware of the terrible destructive power of the bomb. According to one poll a majority of people in the US did not oppose the use of the bomb against Japan. Significantly, however, an earlier poll had found that they were opposed to the use of poison gas. The latter weapon having been used in the First World War, its consequences were fairly common knowledge.
In his memoirs Eisenhower recounts telling Secretary of War Henry Stimson about his misgivings, “First on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary and secondly, because I thought that our country would avoid shocking world opinion by the use of what was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was at that very moment seeking some way to surrender with minimum loss of ‘face’.”
Similarly Leahy wrote, “The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender.” (Hiroshima’s Shadow, editors Kai Bird and Lawrence Lifschultz, 1996.) It needs to be pointed out that many of those opposed to the bomb had not been particularly critical of the indiscriminate firebombing of cities like Dresden and Tokyo that caused heavy civilian casualties. But, even for them, a line was being crossed.
The Franck Report of June 11, 1945 that included scientists like Leo Szilard, the Hungarian-born physicist who had favoured the launch of the A-bomb project, counselled against using the bomb: “We believe — the use of nuclear bombs for an early, unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable. If the United States would be the first to release this new means of indiscriminate destruction upon mankind, she would sacrifice public support throughout the world, precipitate the race of armaments, and prejudice the possibility of reaching an international agreement on the future control of such weapons.”
In much the same vein in a memorandum to the secretary of war, Ralph A Bard, the undersecretary of the Navy, argued that if the bomb had to be used against Japan that country must be given some preliminary warning, reaffirming that Japan was unlikely to hold out for long: “During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be serving for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender.”
The warning proposal was in line with the thinking of a few like Szilard that a city like Hiroshima could be evacuated and then bombed to demonstrate the havoc an A-bomb could wreak, expediting Japanese surrender.
Had the US government heeded the important voices at the time in the US that were counselling restraint with respect to the use of the A-bomb, the enterprise of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the world may have followed a different trajectory; without significantly affecting either the outcome of the war or indeed the post-war balance of power.
The US remains the world’s pre-eminent nuclear power and is at the head of international efforts at nuclear non-proliferation. It played a key role in establishing a global nuclear restraint regime under the nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). More recently, it led the drive for an indefinite extension of the NPT and was central to negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
But, it is instructive that the US has not ratified the treaty. For a more effective global nuclear restraint regime the US has to be more consistent in its policies and impose greater restraint on itself. As a point of departure, it could take a closer look at the fateful consequences of the road not taken in August 1945.
Abbas Rashid is a freelance journalist and political analyst whose career has included editorial positions in various Pakistani newspapers