Musharraf Believes the War with the Taliban Is Lost

PINR has a disturbing analysis that tells us that perhaps Iraq is not the only disaster in the Middle East. Pakistani President Musharraf has always been a reluctant player in the war. His continued tenure as leader of Pakistan comes begrudgingly from the Pashtun tribes on the border with Afghanistan. They are the supporters of the Taliban. Indeed, the Pakistani intelligence service has consistently been supporting the Taliban to ensure stability on it's western border so it can attend to the real threat from India. Indeed, Pakistan intelligence is likely behind nuclear technology in the hands of Iran and North Korea.
What's most disturbing is that a respected independent think tank NOW thinks Musharraf has given up on Afghanistan.

Musharraf's thinking can be seen in his recent decision to make peace with tribal leaders in North Waziristan Agency and his attempt to make peace with tribal leaders in Bajaur Agency, the latter of which fell apart as outside forces likely pressured Musharraf to attack those with whom he was negotiating. Based upon these decisions, it is clear that Musharraf believes that international efforts to exclude the Taliban from political power in Afghanistan will fail. [See: "Intelligence Brief: Musharraf Struggles Against Tribal Militants"]


As part of this assessment, Islamabad recognizes that it cannot afford to lose political influence with the Pashtun tribes on the border. For instance, if the Taliban and its Pashtun supporters are not defeated in Afghanistan, then the movement will flourish. For Pakistan, which is most concerned about its eastern front with India, it would be a strategic blunder to spark an insurgency in the west.


Therefore, Islamabad's dealing with tribal militants displays its revised assessment that the Taliban will not be defeated in Afghanistan. The reason, however, that Islamabad continues to launch occasional strikes against tribal leaders, such as the incident that recently occurred in Bajaur Agency, is because Islamabad is still subject to its interest of cooperating with the United States and its allies in the "war on terrorism." Pakistan, therefore, is forced to follow dual policies which are, at some moments, contradictory.


If Musharraf were to cease attacks against tribal militants, it could force the United States and N.A.T.O. to launch autonomous attacks in Pakistani territory in order to neutralize threats that Islamabad refuses to handle. For the United States and N.A.T.O., it is clear that much of the Taliban's support and recruitment base is in Pakistan's tribal and frontier regions.


If U.S.-led cross-border attacks were to occur, it could spell the death knell of Musharraf's grip on power. Musharraf already faces domestic unrest over his cooperation with the United States, and his failure to prevent the United States and its allies from attacking Pakistani territory would make him extremely unpopular at home and could cause his very own power base, the military, to unseat him.


Therefore, Musharraf and the rest of the government in Islamabad are forced to walk a tightrope in the handling of Pashtun elements in the border region. Until it becomes clear which side is going to prevail -- either Kabul agrees to some form of a government power-sharing role with the resurgent Taliban, or the U.S.-led coalition turns the tide on the Taliban insurgency -- Islamabad will continue to pursue these contradictory policies.