I tend to give world leaders more credit than most. When I see a cohesive foreign policy initiative by any country that seems to make no sense, I look between the lines. The Neo-con influence on Bush has led to a highly aggressive foreign policy that appears to attempt to control world events by taking pre-emptive military actions and acting as a catalyt by provoking the actions of others that will will create a more favorable political climate for Bush policies. In other words, the Bush Administration sees the world from a grand perspective. Whenever the world doesn't see it their way, the administration is willing to manipulate the situation to the make the world into how they expect it to be. They've got it all figured out, so all they have to do is get the enemy to show their hand and support from allies will come their way.
This is cynical arrogance at it's reckless worst. If the world isn't acting as you expect, manipulate it into doing what you want. The assumption that the world is better off in a more confrontational stance is reckless at best.
The Bush Administration is again turning the screws on the North Korea. Here is an excerpt from the LA Times:
By severing some of the few remaining U.S. ties with North Korea in recent days, the Bush administration appears to be trying to further isolate the Pyongyang regime over its pursuit of nuclear weapons, analysts say.
Wednesday's suspension of a Pentagon program to recover the remains of U.S. soldiers killed in the Korean War puts an end to one of the few regular channels of face-to-face contact between Americans and North Koreans. It also cuts off a source of hard currency for the communist nation's army, which was being paid millions to assist in the search for remains.
Also this week, the U.S. refused to renew the contract of the American executive director of an international consortium in charge of supplying energy to North Korea.
[...]
"They couldn't kill the project outright because that would require a consensus among the board members, so they are essentially decapitating it by getting rid of Kartman," Snyder said. Kartman will stay on until August under a month-to-month contract.
The reactor project has always been unpopular with the administration, which saw it as a capitulation to North Korean blackmail during the Clinton administration.
In contrast, the 9-year-old Pentagon program to recover remains from the 1950-53 Korean War had broad conservative support and survived numerous vicissitudes in U.S.-North Korea dealings.
[...]
One North Korea analyst based in Washington said the decision was likely to be interpreted by Pyongyang as a sign that the administration was contemplating a preemptive attack.
"In the hypothetical event that there were a military strike, any POW/MIA team would be at great risk of being held hostage," said the analyst, who asked not to be quoted by name.
Other analysts said the suspension might have more to do with concerns that the North Korean military was pocketing too much money for helping in the recovery operations.
There have been accusations that the North was overcharging for labor; demanding expensive vehicles, equipment and gasoline; and often leading recovery teams to dubious sets of remains.
Things couldn't be much worse on the Korean peninsula. Bush's policies has led to a nuclear powered North Korea, the worst relations between the US and South Korea than ever and now more provocation by the US. Seems as if they are forcing the hand of North Korea? Here is an analysis from The Agonist:
In recent weeks, with the first US charges that N. Korea was getting ready to test one of its nuclear bombs, the variation of the "sucker strategy" heard most often is that in fact, the Bush Administration not only wants the DPRK to test a nuclear weapon, it desperately needs the DPRK to test, since the US 6 Party policy has utterly collapsed.
-- that theory is explained this way: there are no credible "sticks" for Bush, and not just because of the universal assumption that the US is "pinned down" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if the US has force available (hey, we just sent over 15 Stealth...and who knows where our boomers might be), South Korean president Roh has said he won't let the US attack N. Korea without his government's permission, and he's indicated that South Korean aid to the North will continue up to, but perhaps not past, the point of a nuclear test; China has publicly warned the US not to attack, along with the DPRK not to test, and said it won't support any "UN strategy" by the US; Russia indicates much the same thing.
Add up all that and what do you get? That the "last chance" the US has for China and South Korea coming over to the US hard line approach to N. Korea is if Kim Jong-il goes ahead and tests (or attacks something, etc.).
-- ergo, it is argued, the "logic" of the US rhetoric and actions is that the Bush Administration is trying to push N. Korea into testing/doing something stupid and nasty. Some DOD analysts have taken to calling this the "B'rer Rabbit" strategy, after the old Southern folk tale about the smart rabbit who escapes his tormenters by begging "please don't throw me into that briar patch".
By this scenario, the "briar patch" is that the US hardliners are willing to risk everything on one dramatic throw of the dice...oh, we left out a popular item in the original, 2001-2 version of this strategy...that VP Cheney, Rumsfeld, and other advocates of national missile defense "needed" the alleged N. Korean ICBM threat to justify billions for NMD (not to mention co-production with Japan).
If this scenario is right, the Bush Administration is trying to manipulate world events, heat up the tensions on the Korean peninsula until North Korea does something sufficiently provocative to attempt to bring China, Russia, and South Korea closer to US views. Risking war to pressure North Korea?
It's apparent the Administration sees that they are in a win win situation. They figure, if war breaks out, the problem of North Korea will be solved because they'll be beaten. Obviously they believe China won't enter the war and North Korea's multimillion man Armed Forces are not sufficiently effective to do much damage to the South. Apparently they believe that even if the North does use it's bombs, they'll lose. And of course all the casualties will be South Korean.
But why wouldn't China enter the war, at least to a limited extent. Military support for NK could prevent them from going nuclear. China also has internal political and economic problems that will damage it's economic growth in the long run. Their population is restive angry and busting for a fight. Their economy is handicapped by being dependent on the US trade imbalence. Bush is working on improving that trade imbalence at the expense of the Chinese worker. And if a world recession returns, as seems increasingly likely, China's worker will suffer because of the dearth of internal demand on it's own products.
However, a war time economy produced by a regional conflict on the Korean peninsula would create massive internal demand for Chinese products. Loss of demand for it's exports seems inevitable. China needs to keep it's restive population employed and improving it's lot, as well as venting it's rage on external enemies to deflect anger from the Chinese Communist Party. A limited regional war would greatly benefit China in the long run. China tends to think long-range, unlike the US. Time is on it's side, if the government can survive the next decade or so.
Complete Article
NORKS and Nukes
Sean-Paul Kelley | San Antonio | May 28
The Agonist - On Thursday we posted a brief story about 15 F-117s that were being sent to South Korea in the midst of a temporary halt in MIA recovery activities in the North. Last night, both Chris Nelson and the Los Angeles Times (by the way, isn't the L.A. Times doing some great journalistic work lately?) covered the brewing mess that is the Korean peninsula.
Highlights are after the jump, but before we get started here is a backgrounder on my time in Korea, a risk/reward analysis of the situation and my prediction of the Six-Party Talks.
More after the jump.
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By Sean Paul in Asia: NE & Koreas on Sat May 28th, 2005 at 10:39:09 PM PDT
First, I'll highlight the relevant portions of the L.A. Times article:
Wednesday's suspension of a Pentagon program to recover the remains of U.S. soldiers killed in the Korean War puts an end to one of the few regular channels of face-to-face contact between Americans and North Koreans. It also cuts off a source of hard currency for the communist nation's army, which was being paid millions to assist in the search for remains.
Also this week, the U.S. refused to renew the contract of the American executive director of an international consortium in charge of supplying energy to North Korea.
Aid officials are worried that the United States might not make its annual contribution to a United Nations food drive for North Korea.
Barbara Demick goes on to write that the weapons impasse has the administration looking for new ways to pressure North Korea to resume the disarmament talks. Add these three events (one still hypothetical) with the re-deployment of 15 F-117s and what do you get: "a concerted effort by the administration to tighten the screws on Pyongyang."
So, we are suspending what little aid we do give to the DPRK, possibly using food as a weapon and cutting of any communications with the DPRK for what reason?
Per Nelson many believe that what Bush is trying to do is to force the DPRK to test a nuke which will compel the Chinese to support sanctions against the DPRK and thus rescue Bush's failing peninsular policy.
I'd post the snippet but you really need to read all the relevant DPRK portions of his update:
news of Rumsfeld's dispatch of 15 Stealth fighters to South Korea comes on the heels of his pullout of US personnel searching for MIA's in N. Korea, and weeks of speculation over alleged US intel that N. Korea will test a nuclear weapon...all of this mixed in with April's deliberate insults of Kim Jong-il by President Bush, followed by Secretary Rice denying "hostile intent" as evidenced by US acceptance that Kim's government is sovereign, and statements by various officials that "time is running out" for the DPRK to return to the 6 Party negotiating process. Who's time? What happens if they don't?
A UN sanctions battle is the only "official" US strategy, which China has flat out said it won't support, and Russia seems unlikely. So...what is really going on here? Paranoia reigns. Lots of emails warn darkly "this is what Rumsfeld did before Bush officially OK'd the Iraq war...he pre-positioned so much force the war became impossible to avoid." Is the US really preparing air strikes on the Yongbyon reactor? Logic says no. Logic says the US military moves are a forceful effort to pressure China and N. Korea. Seasoned hands warn it may backfire. Some...some...feel that's exactly what US hard-liners want. If NK tests, or attacks in some way, US wins, right? Ummmm.....
1. There's a perfectly logical, and relatively benign explanation for just about any "fact" you want to cite in discussion of the above, whether you think that the US is about to initiate a war in N. Asia (we don't, at least not on purpose) or whether you think all of this is a last, dramatic effort by the US to get China and S. Korea "on our side", tactically, to force the DPRK into negotiating away its nuclear weapons (we do).
-- sample "benign" explanation: DOD's official excuse for pulling out the MIA personnel from N. Korea is that the DPRK is making it impossible to communicate with them out in the field, and this makes safety a serious issue, especially in a crisis. OK, not overwhelmingly convincing, but there's also this: Rumsfeld doesn't control any of the US humanitarian assistance going to N. Korea, but the MIA support budget is close to $2-million, and participants say most of it is dollars gets over there in bags....that's hard cash, just what Kim is known to favor, along with babes, booze, and lobsters.
2. So the "benign" explanation of Rumsfeld's dramatic move, pulling out the MIA team (which, even if nothing bad happens, will be really, really hard to reinsert, experts warn) is that Rummy found that the MIA money is the only "aid" to N. Korea that he can cut off, so by golly that's what he did...and it has the additional virtue, for US hardliners, of showing South Korea how to use leverage, by gum.
-- but we have to tell you that the email airwaves today weren't full of expert observers offering benign explanations, even though many share US frustration with the alleged DPRK refusal to officially respond to the June, 2004 US aid and negotiating position paper, and refusal to come back to the 6 Party process despite their promise, at that time, to return in September.
3. Some observers point out that in September, the DPRK did issue a Foreign Ministry statement discussing the US proposal in some detail, so while it is technically correct there has been no face-to-face negotiating session since last June, this disputable point underscores why HIRC Asia Subcommittee chair Jim Leach spent nearly two hours yesterday parsing the difference between bilateral negotiations embedded in the multilateral 6 Party process, vs simple one-on-one bilats, with A/S Asia Chris Hill.
-- and as we noted in yesterday's Report, Hill seemed to be trying his best to indicate nuance, and thus possible flexibility, in US willingness to negotiate bilaterally, once the DPRK actually took the step of formally rejoining the multilateral process. We do not wish to get into hot water trying to read Hill's mind, so we'll just leave it at that.
4. All of the above also has to be put into the context of the now-confirmed Bush/Roh "summit" here on June 10, and the months of spikes and dips in US-ROK relations, depending on both US actions, and Roh's latest speech denouncing US policy, or declaring his own.
-- while US officials, including Asst. Undersec. Def/Asia Rick Lawless, to HIRC yesterday, claim with some justice that the mil/mil issues are being better handled now, and could be said to be back on track...no one is confident about the political relationship.
5. So another net of all of the above is that Korea experts in and out of power have every reason to be worried, confused, and perhaps vulnerable to conspiracy theories as to what's going on, and what's likely to happen, following the Rumsfeld-led tactical moves this week, and the increasing US diplomatic pressure on China, S. Korea and the DPRK. One result is what we are calling the "informed paranoid school".
-- in fact, this "school" of Bush policy analysis actually dates back to 2001-2002, when the efforts of John Bolton first came under scrutiny...back then, Bush-led US harsh words and refusal to negotiate led to the DPRK defiance of the non-proliferation regime and the current nuclear crisis, which in turn led to the development of the PSI program, and 6 Party process. Not just paranoids argued that US hard liners hoped to provoke N. Korea into initiating some military incident, something bad enough to "prove" the US case, and bring China, the ROK, and Russia over to our side on tactics.
6. In recent weeks, with the first US charges that N. Korea was getting ready to test one of its nuclear bombs, the variation of the "sucker strategy" heard most often is that in fact, the Bush Administration not only wants the DPRK to test a nuclear weapon, it desperately needs the DPRK to test, since the US 6 Party policy has utterly collapsed.
-- that theory is explained this way: there are no credible "sticks" for Bush, and not just because of the universal assumption that the US is "pinned down" in Iraq and Afghanistan. Even if the US has force available (hey, we just sent over 15 Stealth...and who knows where our boomers might be), South Korean president Roh has said he won't let the US attack N. Korea without his government's permission, and he's indicated that South Korean aid to the North will continue up to, but perhaps not past, the point of a nuclear test; China has publicly warned the US not to attack, along with the DPRK not to test, and said it won't support any "UN strategy" by the US; Russia indicates much the same thing.
7. Add up all that and what do you get? That the "last chance" the US has for China and South Korea coming over to the US hard line approach to N. Korea is if Kim Jong-il goes ahead and tests (or attacks something, etc.).
-- ergo, it is argued, the "logic" of the US rhetoric and actions is that the Bush Administration is trying to push N. Korea into testing/doing something stupid and nasty. Some DOD analysts have taken to calling this the "B'rer Rabbit" strategy, after the old Southern folk tale about the smart rabbit who escapes his tormenters by begging "please don't throw me into that briar patch".
8. By this scenario, the "briar patch" is that the US hardliners are willing to risk everything on one dramatic throw of the dice...oh, we left out a popular item in the original, 2001-2 version of this strategy...that VP Cheney, Rumsfeld, and other advocates of national missile defense "needed" the alleged N. Korean ICBM threat to justify billions for NMD (not to mention co-production with Japan).
-- by this argument, why else would the Bush/Cheney Administration refuse to pick-up where the Clinton Administration left off...with a missile freeze deal with Kim, as then-Secretary of State Powell wanted? As we say, that's all part of the "informed paranoid school" of Bushology. There are other items, some amusing, some clearly over the top, and some...just better left unstated.
9. We mention all of this, on the eve of the Memorial Day weekend and a Congressional Recess, because anyone who thinks that analysts in China, South Korea, Australia, et al aren't adding up their own versions of this list...you aren't paying attention. In itself, this represents a massive defeat for US public diplomacy, some observers argue.
-- presumably, cooler, calmer contemplation of strategic and political realities will help calm the breast, if not the mind, of worried observers here and in Asia...and they will likely come to the conclusion that all of this does NOT add up to a genuine Bush Administration plan to attack N. Korea if the DPRK refuses, by June something, to come back to the negotiating table.
10. But all this also raises the issue of whether the posturing and threatening...and sending Stealth's to S. Korea can be interpreted in no other way, regardless of what you think the US hard liners "really want"...what does it all add up to for China? Remember, as Chris Hill yesterday told the House International Relations committee, we're still relying on China to get Pyongyang back, and we're not all that happy with Chinese efforts to date.
-- we asked a seasoned Asia expert and consultant to the US what to make out of all of the above. His answer comes in two parts. First, on the overall situation:
"I actually don't care what Rumsfeld thinks he's doing. What matters is what the NKs perceive the US to be doing, and the marginal risks this action creates at the DMZ and in the way that the DPRK thinks about using its `pre-emptive' deterrent. This is not nuclear balance of terror/Cold War nuclear diplomacy that the US high priesthood of nuclear war are masters of; this is [the risk of] nuclear war now with a nuclear-armed BORG. They won't play according to US rules. They will make up their own rules."
-- then we asked about the specific China/N. Korea impact:
"...taking this action will reduce Chinese leverage in Pyongyang, not increase it, because the NKs know, and Chinese experts are quite open about the fact that any US use of military force against the DPRK will instantly result in Chinese military backing of North Korea unless the conflict is the result of egregious North Korean aggression."
7. That last point brings us back to the "informed paranoid school", does it not? Remember why they think the Bush hard liners want the DPRK to test?
Tell me how this makes sense? I don't know about you but were I a policy-maker, I wouldn't want the proverbial genie out of its bottle running around the Korean Peninsula, sticking its tongue out at me, the Chinese and the Japanese no matter how deluded I was that my pals and I could put it back in.
Yet this is policy.
More as it develops . . .
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