New York Times
WASHINGTON and Baghdad will be tempted, with the adoption of a new Constitution and the election on Thursday for a four-year government, to declare victory in Iraq. In one sense, they are right to do so. The emerging Iraqi polity undoubtedly represents a radical break not only with the country's past but also with the whole Arab state system established by Britain and France after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
But in the larger sense, such optimism is misguided, for none of the problems associated with Iraq's monumental change have been sorted out. Worse, profound tensions and contradictions have been enshrined in the Constitution of the new Iraq, and they threaten the very existence of the state.
[...]All signs suggest that this Constitution, if it is not radically amended, will further weaken the already failing central Iraqi state. In spite of all the rhetoric in that document about the unity of the "homeland of the apostles and prophets" and the "values and ideals of the heavenly messages and findings of science" that have played a role in "preserving for Iraq its free union," it is disunity, diminished sovereignty and years of future discord that lie in store for Iraq if the Constitution is not overhauled.
Democracy is not reducible to placing an Iraqi seal of approval upon a situation that is manifestly worsening by the day. The 79 percent of people who voted in favor of a constitution that promotes ethnic and sectarian divisions are unwittingly paving the way for a civil war that will cost hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives. Nothing is worth that.
Without the return of real power to the center, the ascent of sectarian and ethnic politics in Iraq to the point of complete societal breakdown cannot be checked. We cannot fight the insurgency, rebuild Iraq and live in any meaningful sense as part of the modern world without a state. There are no human rights, no law, and no democracy without the state; there is only anarchy and a state of insecurity potentially much worse than what Iraqis are experiencing today. For democracy to emerge out of the current chaos in Iraq, the state must be saved from the irresponsibility of the Iraqi parties and voting blocs that are today killing it. MORE
Juan Cole outlines the likely outcomes in the election and the best and worse case outcomes for American policy.
One possibility is that the Shia religious parties and the Sunni religious parties will form a pan-Islamic coalition. The Kurds wouldn't be happy about that but a coalition like that would have a chance of dealing with the guerrilla movement and bring them in from the cold.
Since the Kurds are the group most friendly to the United States, a coalition like that would very critical of the United States. And since it would be dominated by the Shiite parties, it will have warm relations with Tehran.
Any way you cut it, the new government is going to want to negotiate a significant reduction in American troop presence and influence. Moqtada al-Sadr, who has always demanded a quick withdrawal of the U.S. troops, will have 30 of his people on the UIA slate. There are a lot of rumors that Ayatollah Sistani will issue a fatwa demanding a strict timetable, and that would have a big effect.
Some people in the Bush administration wanted this to end with a friendly government in Baghdad that would welcome or tolerate long-term U.S. military bases. It's clear they're not going to get that.
The best they can hope for now is a weak parliamentary government, with a strong Islamist tinge to it that might have some people in it who are U.S. clients and will listen to some kind of special pleadings for U.S. interests in matters of oil and construction contracts.
The worst-case scenario is much more frightening. Under most scenarios, the insurgency goes on, perhaps for 10 more years. If the Americans aren't very careful about how they leave, we could end up with a hot civil war that could turn into a regional war. If it is an all-out war between Shia and Sunni you could have Iran coming in on one side and Saudi Arabia on the other. You have guys involved here who have already pioneered oil pipeline sabotage as a tool of guerrilla war. So that scenario would put 20 percent of the world's petroleum production at risk of being taken off the market.
So we have elections and a constitution that are helping create worse conditions and increasing the likelihood of a civil war. The new government with Iraqi will have a cozy relationship with Tehran. Bush got his political turkey at the expense of a pile of Iraqi bodies, not to mention the sons and daughters from America. The foreign policy gains the Neo-cons promised have turned into major losses and a stronger Iran.
Despite the continued stupidity in the war, there is some good news. Sunni nationalists are organizing and may well play a role in this election and in the government in a coalition with Kurdish Sunnis. Perhaps a secular pan Iraqi coalition can emerge.
Informed Comment
Al-Hayat's sources say that several changes have occurred in the arena of guerrilla action in 2005, which have benefited the Iraqi nationalist groups that reject attacks on civilians and the practice of "excommunicating" (takfir) other Muslims. The method of "national resistance" has instead gained advantages over the bloody tactics of the jihadis, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and Ansar al-Islam. More than 50 guerrilla bands, including "Phalanges of the 1920 Revolution," "the Army of Islam," "The Army of Holy Warriors", "Holy Warriors of the Armed Forces," are actually led, despite their Islamist names, by officers of the former Iraqi military. They have decided to unite their ranks and will soon announce a Front for the Iraqi Resistance, which will comprise all these guerrilla groups. They will adopt joint military and political stances. This front will be led by a "Consultative Council" that includes former officers, clerics and clan elders. It will be charged with working to prevent attacks on civilians and with promoting dialogue for the purpose of "expelling the occupiers."
Robert Dreyfuss references a TIME.com article that talks about US Ambassador Zal Khalilzad trying to exploit the differences between the Zarqawi led jihadis and the Baathists who dominate the insurgency. Dreyfuss thinks the US may finally be onto something in the negotiation side of the Iraqi conflict.
[...]a TIME investigation, based on dozens of interviews with military and intelligence officials as well as Iraqi leaders inside and outside the insurgency, reveals that Iraqis are reclaiming the upper hand, forcing al-Zarqawi to adjust. Differences between Baathist insurgent groups and al-Qaeda are driven by discomfort with al-Zarqawi's extreme tactics and willingness among some Iraqi commanders to join the political process. U.S. officials in Baghdad confirm to TIME that they have stepped up their efforts to negotiate with nationalist insurgents and the Sunnis they represent. "We want to deal with their legitimate concerns," U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad tells TIME. "We will intensify the engagement, interaction and discussion with them."
[...]U.S. military intelligence believes that were it not for al-Zarqawi, the nationalists would have developed a political identity by now. Differences in means and ends have long caused friction among the odd bedfellows of the resistance. From the beginning there have been two wars fought in Iraq, one of liberation and one of global holy war. "Insurgency and terror are two different things,[...]" says Khalilzad.
[...]Sunni insurgent leaders say it was their insistence on voting in the October referendum that discouraged al-Zarqawi from disrupting the poll. For now, the nationalists say they will be voting again on Dec. 15, and they expect al-Qaeda to once more hold its fire. But so far no announcements have been made, and nationalist commanders are worried that al-Zarqawi may decide to go for broke this time.
[...]Adopting the long-standing attitudes of secular Baathists, some Sunni leaders tell TIME they have lost patience with al-Zarqawi and would consider cutting a political deal with the U.S. to isolate the jihadis. "If the Americans evidenced good intent and a timetable for withdrawal we feel is genuine, we will stand up against al-Zarqawi," says Abdul Salam al-Qubaisi, spokesman for the Association of Muslim Scholars. "We already stood up against him on the Shi'ite issue, and if he doesn't follow us, it will be a bad path for him." Baathist insurgent leader Abu Yousif, who has met with U.S. intelligence officers, says, "The insurgency is looking for a political outlet--once we have that, we could control al-Qaeda."
U.S. officials are actively exploring political bargains that might induce nationalists to split with al-Qaeda, including an easing of restrictions on former Baathists' involvement in the new government. Khalilzad says it's time for the "excesses" in the de-Baathification process to be reversed, a call echoed by military-intelligence officials. MORE
It seems very likely any political compromise will include some sort of time table for withdrawal of some US troops. A fatwa from Sistani will make it happen even if the government flounders in making a decision.
Best possible outcome I can imagine is a central government dominated by Shias allied with Iran but not totally unfriendly with the US. The secular Iraqis have a shot at an opposition coalition with secular Sunnis. Whoever can answer the question of oil profits for the Sunni triangle region will be in the position of carrying the Sunni vote. Otherwise, the fundamentalist Shia and Sunnis will coalesce.
Worse possible outcome is a civil war with a region split between Sunnis and Shias taking sides in the conflict with twenty percent of the world's oil in harms way.
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